Short Essay #1
Jordin Post
2/16/16
A Preliminary
Exploration of Defining (In)Justice as Set Forth in Book II
At the
beginning of Book Two, Glaucon takes on Thrasymachus’s argument for injustice
being better than justice and fleshes it out to the fullest and richest argument
he can make, even if he doesn’t agree with the idea at all. Glaucon throws many
things at Socrates, most of which Socrates either combats handily in Book Two
or further down the line. The point Socrates manages to ignore—or at least
seemingly ignore—is one of the first Glaucon makes: The first definition of
justice/injustice. First, Glaucon’s definition is addressed, along with some
implications made by the definition. Then I assert (albeit with suspicion) that
Socrates only addresses part of what Glaucon’s point made by his definition;
what scrap of bone Socrates decides to throw Glaucon and the reader doesn’t
seem sufficient. Outlined towards the end are further questions that can stem
from this project—worthy of examination, but unable to be put forward as part
of research until this issue is resolved.
Glaucon’s
opening argument is scathing, and it all stems from how he originally defines
justice. “[Justice] is a mean between what is best—doing injustice without
paying the penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to
avenge oneself” (358e&359a). It is, admittedly, not too far off from
anything we saw in book one. What it does differently is defines justice in the
context of injustice. Justice is not a virtue as described earlier and later in
the Republic. Justice is simply the
laws preventing injustice from happening. Glaucon doesn’t go on to define
injustice explicitly; all we are provided on that front are examples, such as
the story of the Ring of Gyges. Even if we don’t necessarily know what
injustice is at this point, Glaucon’s definition ties justice and injustice
together, making them dependent on one another.
The
other, subtler part of Glaucon’s definition of justice has to do with what he
calls “the genesis and being of justice.” According to Glaucon, people need to “set
down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it” in
order to protect themselves. The idea resembles a form of social contract
theory. People are giving up their rights to perform injustices in order to
form a group of people—I am willing to go so far as to say a city—in order to
protect themselves from injustices being enacted on the people in the group. Borrowing
a term from Locke and other political theorists, this argument implies a
worldview that the state of nature (the baseline of how people act) is unjust
and, based off of Glaucon’s examples, fairly violent. There is no specialization
that says people who are naturally talented at fighting will commit unjust
killings; everyone is unjust, unless
they are restrained for convenience.
It’s no
wonder that Socrates initially hesitates to tackle what Glaucon and his brother
put up as a defense for injustice! And, yet, the Republic is a testament to that herculean challenge, as he promises
to address as much of their arguments as possible to prove that justice itself
is worthy and justice unworthy—excluding the benefits of the former while
letting the latter have them. Among everything Socrates begins in Book Two
(which is quite a bit), Socrates only addresses part of Glaucon’s definition
and implications of injustice, and he does it indirectly. Socrates’ decision to
make a city as a macroscopic view on justice stems not only from Thrasymachus’
use of cities in book one, but also Glaucon’s definition early in the book. To
Socrates, Glaucon has the right idea to pin justice and injustice to the
gathering of people. Socrates even puts forth a social contract of his own in
his creation of the city analogy, stating “well then… a city, as I believe,
comes into being because each of us isn’t self-sufficient but is in need of
much” (369b). The choice to make a city is an acknowledgement of Glaucon’s
point, as is pinning the genesis of the city to a social contract. When
Socrates asks whether or not this genesis of the city is true, Glaucon doesn’t
object, even though the wording and intention seem to be different than what he
proposed earlier.
It is
Glaucon’s lack of objection or clarification that makes Socrates’ social
contract so interesting. Glaucon is not shy when it comes the argument, even at
this early stage in the Republic. His
easy agreement on this point must mean that either he believes that what
Socrates says either sufficiently overpowers what he said previously, agrees
with the concept in order to prove it ad
absurdum later, or he just trusts that Socrates will take it on later when
it is relevant. I am immediately disinclined to believe the last option, as
Glaucon rushes and is willing to sidetrack Socrates over points he feels are
important and overlooked in several parts of the Republic. Point two doesn’t seem to be true either, as Socrates’
base for the city is something he continues to use as an analogy throughout
much of the Republic—for its basic
premise to be rendered ad absurdum
would dismantle the entire city-soul analogy altogether. The statement itself
doesn’t seem to disprove or overpower Glaucon’s point either. If anything,
coming together to stave off injustice can be considered part of the very
general “much” that people need when they come together to work as a city.
While
Socrates seems to pull many ideas from Glaucon’s argument (even if he doesn’t
agree with them), he completely ignores Glaucon’s attempt to make justice and
injustice dependent on one another. Before the feverish city is made, Socrates
asks Adeimantus “where in [the complete healthy city], then, would justice and injustice be? Along with
which of the things we considered did they come into being” (371e). Socrates
takes the separation as justice and injustice to be an assumption in his
argument, which is again a point that
Glaucon does not argue against him for. I will admit to finding no evidence to
point at anything Socrates says directly or indirectly pointing out why Glaucon’s
assumption isn’t true.
Having
looked at all these angles and not found anything yet from them, I conclude
that Socrates doesn’t sufficiently argue against Glaucon’s original point. I
put this forward with skepticism, as Plato seems too cunning to include such a
definition into Glaucon’s speech and not address it. Perhaps, then, Plato does
not have Socrates refute this part of the argument because there is a kernel of
truth to it that needs to be explored by the readers. Our interlocutors and
Socrates are on the pursuit of justice—to let injustice slip in would be
counter to their goal—but it may not be entirely wrong for it to be included.
Word Count without further exploration paths: 1128
Word Count with: 1310
------------------------
Where to take this argument further (in bullets to make
things easier!)
·
Regarding Glaucon’s State of Nature (SoN) ||
Violence in Book 2
o
How the immediate violence of the Ring of Gyges
reflects Glaucon’s state of nature argument.
o
How violence plays out in the early city
§
The genesis of war from the feverish city
§
How the spiritedness of the auxiliaries could
cause violence (and how it relates to Glaucon’s SoN argument
·
Can Glaucon’s definition of justice in book one
be reconciled with Socrates’ definition of justice in book four?
o
It seems that they can, if Glaucon is willing to
expand the definition of justice. Justice of the soul means to maintain the
parts with harmony. If the state of nature (being unjust) is also the basic
nature of the soul, does justice maintain the soul against its basic unjust
nature?
·
Why does Plato let some of Glaucon’s points stay
without argument?
No comments:
Post a Comment