Thursday, March 31, 2011

Parmenides: The One

I would like to continue this discussion about the forms and this description of “the one” in Parmenides. First, I would like to conclude that the forms and “the one” are the same thing because the context seems to imply that this is the case even though it is not explicit despite the passage that seems to separate the two things. However, in making this conclusion, as brought up in class, how do we explain that more than one thing can embody the same form if it (the form) is one and cannot be divided? Could we offer the conclusion that more than one thing is a reflection of a form but does not acquire an actual piece of that form? Or should we go with Socrates' theory of the sunlight? Or should we conclude the theory of the sail that was proposed in the text? I would like to propose my personal theory that I just mentioned regarding a reflection. Perhaps each form is like a mirror. A mirror is able to reflect multiple different things at one time without being divided. Also, in terms of being in parts or being a whole, the mirror analogy also fits well. I would like to argue that forms do not have parts. Forms, like a mirror, do not require to be in parts to reflect, or to embody multiple things.


Now, in terms of "the one" being in neither in rest or in motion as discussed in Parmenides, how does that come to be is the big question. One automatically assumes that if something is not in rest, then it is in motion, and if it is not in motion, then it is in rest. It seems that it is only two options here and no between. However, maybe one could suggest that it is in this state of becoming in which it was in this state of rest and is becoming in motion, or it was in motion and is becoming at rest. In other words, it is in neither rest or motion because it is in its becoming stage. However, there is never any indication by the text that it will ever reach a state of rest or motion, so if we go with my theory, then the one will always remain in the becoming stages of being in motion or in rest.

What can Parmenides tell us about Being?

What can Parminedes tell us about being? He offers a description and gives a few arguments. He argues that being is eternal and being cannot come into being and also that it cannot go out of being. Being cannot come into being because the problem would then become where did it come from. So if being were to come into being then it would have to come from something that is not being. And also, what is non being? Parminedes says that non being cannot be a concept. Another thing is that being cannot go out of being because then where would it go? I think that this is where Parmenides gets his concept of eternal from.

Parmenides also claims that being is indivisible, that it cannot be divided into parts. Being is one, according to Parmenides. If being were to have parts then we would have to say that this one thing is a part of being and this other thing is a part of being, etc. I mean, with the example from my hand on my body. I know that my hand is different than my foot, right? My hand is not my foot. But with being this concept is difficult because we cannot say something like “not being” because Parmenides rules out the concept of not being. From this Parminedes concludes that being is one.

From this I am assuming that Parmenides is referring to reality being one. I think Parmenides is a genius.

Monday, March 21, 2011

Theory about Plato

I was thinking that maybe the reason why Plato never answers any of his questions in a more direct manner is because he does not want to influence our answers. While he tries to teach us the right way to think about a topic and guide us towards certain topics worth exploring, he does not impose us his ideologies. Reading his works separately I will admit is not an easy task; relating them under one umbrella however, for me particularly, make all his ideas more sensible.

While Plato seems to specifically dissect the human soul in the republic; I have come to believe that most of his works have one specific goal to analyze the different parts of human nature, and to help individually define who we are. The books that we’ve covered thus far examined virtue, perception, justice etc; they all have a common thread and its man’s true nature.

Is it possible that Plato knew the answers to the questions he sought? Is it possible that he did not answer them to give our own conclusion a sense of individuality? I know of course that it is probably a possibility I’d be grateful to know why exactly it would be a plausible theory?

Friday, March 18, 2011

Plato: Godfather of Soul

I believe that at this point, I could portray fairly accurately the model of the soul for Socrates. Firstly, the soul is immortal, unable to be broken, and exists in an immaterial sense. It is the master of the body (not vice-versa), yet can still be influenced by bodily pleasures. It leaves the body upon death (in a sense, it causes the death of the body and causes the life of a new body) and goes into the realm of forms where it commutes with all forms and gains all possible knowledge. Aside from all of this, I am interested as to where the soul originated.

In the Timeaus, there are two accounts given of the creation of earth: the first account is that of the Intellectual and the second account being that of Necessity.  I am particularly curious about the second account's claim that there are three things that existed even before the universe existed (out of necessity): being, becoming, and space. I am curious as to how the soul would exist in one of these three conditions if it were to exist before the universe came to be* (for lack of a better word). If the soul were to exist as being, then it would be unable to change; that is, it wouldn't change from one body to the next, or change from the material realm to the form realm. If the soul were to exist as becoming, it is necessary that it would always be changing and becoming. This condition would render the soul as being made and then destroyed constantly if this cycle were to come close to being in the infinite nature of the soul. But this wouldn't be the same soul in a sense, it would be a new soul created and destroyed each time. Yet, surely, the soul doesn't exist in space which is to be understand as simply the place for something to be or become.

If I am to salvage the image of the soul for me, I'm left to consider a few new possibilities: a) the soul might not be immortal, b) the soul has a part that is immortal and a part that isn't immortal (one part that is being and another part that is becomming), or c) the soul came after the universe was made. In the nature of Socrates, I wish to maintain that the soul is immortal; however, I wish to shine light on the fact that Socrates has proposed a model of the soul that contained different parts that were constituted an entire soul. Perhaps, in a sense, it is possible to present this model altered for our purposes. Perhaps the soul is that which is composed of both being and becoming at once; that is, perhaps it has a certain nature of actualization (to coin Aristotle) and a nature of potentiality. The soul would have two distinct parts that constitute a sense of worldly being that is constantly becoming something new so as to correspond to the world in flux and it would have a part that always is the same and doesn't change to the world. To think of this graphically, the part of being (not changing) would be like the center with the part of becoming (changing) on the outside.
Yet, even with this model, I'm afraid that more problems arise; is it possible to both be and to also become? If this is so, there would be no necessity for the soul to enter the body to be its master (if it has the power to actualize all at once with no body).

Final thought: the soul of the world must have come after the universe existed, or at the same time by both necessity and by wordily definition. If the soul of the world came after the universe existed, then it seems to follow by sub-alternation that the souls of people came afterward as well.

Sunday, March 13, 2011

Families

I want to talk about the subject in 18d of the Timaeus reading when they were talking about the procreation of children. This subject was odd for me because Timaeus and Socrates said that they agreed that everyone should have spouses and that things should be put into place that hinder people from recognizing his or her own child. Also, everything would be set up so that everyone would look at each other as family. To me, this sounds like some kind of communist way of thinking. I can’t imagine why they would agree that this system of raising families would possibly be sufficient. In my opinion, this would be the worst system because it would prevent everyone from knowing what a real family is. How could this system possibly work?

Thursday, March 3, 2011

Forms and Creativity

In Phaedo, Plato discusses his theory on forms. He argues that forms hold the true meaning of things in themselves. For instance, Plato speaks about beauty. He says,

[I]f someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons--for all these confuse me--...that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. ...[I]t is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful (Plato 100d-100e).


Plato is arguing that when we apply the term beautiful to an object, we explain this by verbalizing how it exemplifies beauty in describes the characteristic of that thing. However, only the form of beauty can exemplify what beauty is in itself absent from material objects. Also, in relation to the forms, Plato uses the example of height. Plato argues that we become tall after being short in terms of the theory of opposites; however, based on the theory of forms, tallness does not derive from shortness. Tallness is a form that already exists and is separate from shortness. Plato implies that new forms cannot be made instead they are merely discovered. In The Courage to Create, Plato’s theory fits in perfectly with Rollo May’s definition of the courage to create which is “the discovering of new forms” (May 21). So, perhaps, to be creative does not mean one is creating something purely and entirely new, but one is simply discovering something new that no one else has seen. A true artist is able to tap into the realm of the forms and come back bearing gifts of new discoveries. Plato argues that only the soul is able to experience the universe of forms, and to do so, the soul has to be separated from the body. If Plato’s theory is true, then it is as if artists are capable of out of body experiences, and these experiences provide us with art.



May, Rollo. The Courage to Create. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. Print.