Aristotle and Virtue Ethics

In Aristotle's Virtues Ethics, taken from his much larger work, Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the ultimate goal of life is to achieve happiness, which is chosen of its own accord as an end (never as a mean to any other virtue). Furthermore, Aristotle states that happiness is "an activity of the soul" that can only be achieved when one is activing in accordance with reason, and in this way, happiness is the "supreme good" and the highest of virtues; the purest excellence. Aristotle then proceeds to outline the two major branches of virtue: intellectual virtue and moral virtue. Intellectual virtue, according to Aristotle, stems from teaching and to a certain extent is an inherent capacity, whereas moral virtue is the "outcome of habit"---it must be cultivated by direct experience through our action. Aristotle then proceeds to describe virtue as being the disposition between two vices, namely excess and deficiency. Virtue can therefore be described as a mean state, for a mean state is not full of either extreme. Aristotle goes on to cite some actions that are decidedly either excesses or deficiency and have no mean, such as adultery, which is always a grave sin, according to Aristotle's views. Do you agree with Aristotle in that virtues should be described as mean states lying between two vices or do you think that they should not even be compared relative to vices? Also, do you think that virtue ethics is compatible with deontology? For if we are acting out of reason in accordance with virtue, would not we be living according to a deontological principle? Just food for thought. :)

Is Virtue Relative?

Macintyre suggests that virus are "aquired human qualities" derived from specific "cultural and social traditions".  This makes sense because the way one is taught from a young age to live his/her life is most likely the values he/she will hold as true later in life.  But what happens if a child grows up in an environment that distorts "good" virtues?  What's to say one culture is wrong about its interpretation of virtuous? Are there then even such things that are universally virtuous?  Time and place seem to heavily influence one's collection of virtues.  That is clear in Macintyre's account of several different figures/movements in history that all hold different qualities of virtue with esteem.  It would be logical to conclude that as societal standards change, virtues change.  But to me it seems to be a "cop-out" to say that because another person's view of virtue is different then I can do whatever I want.  It shifts responsibility and accountability.  However, Macintyre does say that there is a centralized, singular concept that brings all interpretations of virtue together: practice.  The practice he refers to is the pursuit towards a certain kind of excellence, or way of life, by following all the right "rules".  But who creates these standards of excellence that a person strives to follow?  Are they understood universally?

Were the Nazis Just Unlucky?

In our discussion of Nagel's "Moral Luck", one of the main points that we considered was the idea that being a member of the Nazis was somewhat circumstantial and that, had someone who was a member of the Nazis lived in a different part of the world, he or she might have lived a blameless life. Likewise, a person who had lived a peaceful, seemingly moral life might have been a Nazi if he or she had been given the opportunity or put in the same situation as the members of the Nazi party. I think that while circumstance definitely has something to do with our actions insofar as morality is concerned, I do not believe that it is the only factor in determining how we will act in a given situation. If it was the case that all of morality was simply a matter of being in the right place at the right time, so to speak, then what would be the point of even trying to act in a way that we perceive to be moral, since everything would be at the mercy of chance? I think that instead of morality being a matter of luck, it is something that is internal and must be practiced, almost like muscle memory in a way. The more we train ourselves to act in accordance with out beliefs about morality, the easier it is to adhere to our principles and act morally in the future. Since so many of our moral decisions are made in a split second, or are based on a gut reaction, if we have practiced our moral beliefs enough, then acting in a way that does not compromise these beliefs is likely to almost be a reflex. So, going back to the example of the Nazis, I believe that while circumstance and luck was definitely not on their side, it is not the case that these were the only factors concerned in their participation in the party. Had they practiced adhering to their values to the extent that their moral beliefs were always in view, they might have led very different lives despite their location and bad luck.

Deontological Ethics: Kant

In The Moral Law, Kant is looking for a universal moral law that everyone can live by. He says that in a post-Darwinian world, people want to explain the moral law through anthropology; explaining it through scientific reasoning. One of the things he spends time talking about is the fact that you cannot have good will without reason, because reason was made to guide good will. My question, then is, is it possible to follow/think through reason but still act upon what you think instinctively? Isn't that what people do anyways, follow their instincts even after reasoning through the situation? 

Would Fried say parents are harmful?

In "The Evil of Lying," Fried argues that lying to someone is harmful. Parents lie to their children quite often and do not reveal the truth until the child is much older. The most obvious cases would be Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, and the stork. So in this case, Fried would say that parents are harmful to their children and that they are morally wrong. I wonder if/how this changes once the parents reveal their lies to the child.

Is Kant a fan of the Golden Rule?

Categorical imperative: "Act that the maxim of your action can be a universal law."

Golden rule: "Treat others as you wish to be treated."

Is the Categorical Imperative a much broader, more universal form of the golden rule? I'm not saying they're exactly the same, but pretty darn close.

My views on Deontological Ethics/ Kant

After reading the views of Immanuel Kant, I think that I am sold on deontology. It makes perfect since that the rightness and wrongness of an act should be determined by its qualities not its assumed consequences. Going against individual moral principles therefore would be unacceptable for the sake of a guess. If morality is something that we all are familiar with, it would just make the most logical sense that obeying these principles should be absolute, not being contingent depending on certain circumstances. What made the most since is Kant's test to determine the moral status of an act. According to Kant, if the principle the act is based on could logically be a universal law, then the act is acceptable. For example, if a situation calls for an individual to lie for the sake of potentially doing good, Kant argues that since ethics are absolute, If the law made it so that people have to tell lies instead of the truth that would not be right. I most certainly agree with this.

What Would Jesus have done in Omelas?

So, I'm not really sure how I feel about negative harm. Is it a thing, is it not a thing? I don't know. My morality is colored by my religion, and that is probably why I tend to believe that if I witness a wrong occurring, and it is within my power to stop it, I am morally obligated to stop it. If I saw a person being mugged, or raped (yeah, this just got real) on a street somewhere, and did nothing to stop it, I would not be pleased with myself. Yes, it was not my fault that this bad thing happened, but I did have the ability to stop it, and I didn't do so. To me, that makes me almost as bad as the perpetrator.

Does that mean I believe in negative harm? Maybe. I do know that it is a hard thing to consider with Omelas, because there my fixing a harm being done to one person would harm hundreds. I read that story my freshman year in FYS, and we talked about it. A similar discussion to the one that we've had in this class; someone in that FYS class brought up Jesus and Christianity. Now, I try to deny to myself that I am a consequentialist, but sometimes that seeps through, and I had to stop and think for a moment about what I would want to do in this situation (rescue the child) and how that could be wrong because I would have been damning a whole city by doing so. I had to wonder (as cliche as it is) "What Would Jesus do?" I concluded that the correct answer was that Jesus would have taken the place of the child (assuming that a substitution could be made, Le Guin never addresses that).

Is that an incorrect interpretation of Jesus' teachings? Is this a deontological viewpoint, saving the child because it's right, or a consequentialist one, keeping the many people happy?

I do know that if I saw that child, and did nothing (for this post, walking away is something), I would not be able to live with myself afterwards.

Star Trekkin through Ethics.

So,  Vulcans are the theoretical elevation of logic within the bipedal psyche.  I like the way that star trek seems to poke fun at the Enlightenment.  For those who don't know,  the Enlightenment is taught in Mercer's Great Books program as the area of time right about 16-1900 when philosophers started to suggest that reason was the most noble aim in human perception.  The reverberations of this philosophy are felt all over the place in our world today.

I enjoy the quote at the end of Star Trek 6 from Leonard Nimoy's character "Spock" suggesting that the Vulcans as a species are too inflexible to be relevant to the world of the 24th century.  It seems to me that the possibility of being inflexible in our understanding of the world can beset all of us as we study ethics this semester.

So,  to avoid this quandary,  don't read blog posts and watch star trek on a sunday night...

Merry MLK day, everyone!

The Dependance of Personal Action on the Moral Situation at Hand

So far in Ethics, we have primarily focused on the importance of a few general theories and our valuation of their validity, or rightness. However, as important as these theories are to one's structural interpretation and understanding of reality; I have realized that, more important than any theory, is the particular context in which humans apply that general theory. I am no doubt a flip flopper, and yet, as Dr. Thomas pointed out to me, I am not. In every situation, my actions are dependent on external conditions. Whether I act on principle or utility, my actions are conditional on the variables of the situation at hand. So, in that sense, I am most certainly not deontological(from what I understand of the term =), because my actions are never unconditionally motivated. Paradoxically, these very principles often stem from our valuation of the effects their application creates in everyday reality. Oh, wait, I am a little deontological. Because I do believe that the intrinsic quality, intention, and principle of an act do very much matter in judging a things rightness; but, I also at the same time believe consequences do have a bearing on the very same act. But, I don't know. This stuff is good for the right hemisphere though.

The Reason for Ethics

According to the class definition, ethics is the application of reason to our moral behaviour.  This definition sets up an interesting distinction between that which is rational and that which is moral.  Studying this frame of reference can lend some worth to understanding what a moral action is, what purpose reason serves in ethics, and what the reason for ethics is.

First and foremost is the consideration of moral behaviour.  It has to be addressed in brief: moral behaviour is a complex thing. The fact of several theories about how to determine ethical behaviour points to this fact.  Like many things in life moral behaviour defies the simplicity of our communicative symbolism.

That being said, part of the beauty of the human experience lies in the communicative process and the way that we are able to convey information between each other using symbols and language.  Effective communication provides a survival incentive for human beings, as it allows for the observations of physical dangers, predators, and resources to be shared among the human collective (tribes, cities, countries, etc). Reason underlies the communicative process of human beings because definite symbols in our language have clear definitions, and constructions based upon these symbols have clear meanings. Reason,  then,  serves as the tool through which humans attempt to relate the dearth of human experiences to each other concisely thus maximizing the survival incentive in language.

By applying this tool to our moral behaviour, we ask ourselves as humans what things we value.  The complexity of the ethical theories starts here.  In the logical model there is a action followed by a consequence or a response.  Utilitarianism suggests that the most important value in the ethical equation should be in the result that maximizes usefulness (and it is worth noting that the focus tends to rest on the individual as an actor).  Deontology suggests that a principle in action should have the most value and infers that the value of the principle supersedes any value of consequences.  There are other models that suggest the relationship between an actor (or group of actors) and the choice being made matters the most. (Any Walking Dead-heads remember Dale?)  The purpose of studying our moral behavoiur, then, is to be able to concisely relate these experiences to others.  It would behoove us as scholars to recognize that the logical model that underlies the communicative symbolism is limited in its ability to accurately represent the experiences of one human to another, and so over-focusing on either potential source of value (in either action or consequence in the logical model) might be the result of the inefficacy of the logical model through which we analyze the experience of moral behaviour.

While a minimalist can say that the survival of the most people at all times is the most ethical course of behavoiur as it is the most rational course of behaviour,  it belies the complexity of the human experience.  It also assumes a positive answer to the question of whether or not life has value.  An interesting point in Utilitarianism is that it suggests that maximizing pleasures and minimizing pains is the ultimate course of action.  In that model,  a intelligent person with a propensity for murder can maximize his personal pleasure (as well as his personal pain) by eliminating everyone on the planet in an planet wide extinction.  That particular action would also have the added benefit of minimizing the pain experienced on the whole of the planet in the course of the next few years.  Remember,  then,  that the focus of the action in ethical quandary seems to be on the individual as an actor. Can we consider his action ethical? If he is the sole survivor (perhaps a bunker of sorts), then his pleasure is maximized, and pain (on a planetary scale) is minimized.  His presumable eventual death would maximize his pain and remove all of his pleasures, but it would allow an elation that would be unparalleled in that instance. If his survival is not predicated as a worthy goal,  this action might be construed as ethical along those lines. (consider a slightly off point suggestion, too, that the pain of a death for this man is unavoidable, it is just a matter of propinquity).  The question of value matters a great deal to this question, then, and the focus of consideration on an individual actor might bear some consideration as well.

Ethics,  then, suggests that the communication of a set of moral information is important,  but it capitalizes on the survival incentive that is provided by reasonable understanding between humans.  Ultimately, I don't disagree with this suggestion, but i do hope to point out the challenges of living and learning through a rational brain in an irrational world.  The locus of behaviours in our lives (and the conversations we have had in class) suggests that we need to refine the things that we try to communicate to others about what moral behaviour is,  in order to do so more effectively.  In doing so,  we become more ethical.

The Ones who walk away from Omelas

I found this story troublesome as many of you also did.  When confronted with the question of what to do in this situation, how is it best to weigh one's options?  Calculate them with Bentham's methods or talk about quality with Mill?  Would I want to do a "greater good" by keeping the child locked up, thus keeping the whole town of people as they are, happy in their utopia?  Or shall I give the child a (hopefully) better quality of life if it were to be freed at the cost of the whole city's suffering?  Can one not teach the child in secret so that it learns the ways of the world and comfort again, in a neutral way such that kindness is not shown but that the child can come to understand this kindness somehow?  Is it better to sacrifice one for the many?  How do you plead?  What will sit better with one's conscience, the dissatisfaction and unhappiness of one to save many or the satisfaction of that one at the cost of the dissatisfaction of many?  Is there a way to have both parties satisfied?  If you walk away from the city of Omelas, you have made the choice that you are per say, washing your hand of it as you cannot do anything for the child, but you are still faced with the fact that the child is still there suffering and its suffering has not changed.  Is it better to walk away and plan to come back later to lead a revolution against such things?  If you think of this in terms of good and bad, can bad exist without good or good exist without bad?  Are these parts of the story so dependent on one another that you cannot have one without the other?  When it was said that the utopia would no longer be a utopia if the child was shown kindness, how bad could this be?  Could it be possible to "learn from your mistakes"?  Lets say for instance, that many people cannot hold their heads upright and their inner voice cannot keep quiet; their conscience gets the best of them and they wish to help the poor child.  If the child is helped then all, including the child will now live no longer in a utopia, but a place not so great as it once was.  Can it then be a time to rebuild and rethink, anew, with flourishing to begin again, and all consciences clean with the feeling of doing a sort of right and of what is just?  If what is just is the most good, should it not be pursued at all costs even after counting the consequences?  Does not justice prevail over immorality?

In Kai Nielsen's A Defense of Utilitarianism, he seems to be opposed to the idea of conservatism because it is unjustified. He states that conservatism is, "a normative theory which maintains that there is a privileged moral principle or cluster of moral principles, prescribing determinate actions, with which it would always be wrong not to act in accordance no matter what the consequences." With this said, I want to talk about The Case of the Innocent Fat Man. The basic story goes that the fat man got stuck at the mouth of the cave, trapping people inside. The problem occurs when the high tide comes, because it will essentially drown the fat man as well as everyone else in the cave. The moral dilemma, then, is whether to kill the fat man (with a stick of dynamite that someone has) or for everyone to die. I think this situation is very different from the other cases presented in Nielsen's reading because in this case, you have the possibility of being either the fat man or the people in the cave. You may have a particular opinion depending on which side of the situation you are in. If I were one of the people stuck in the cave, I don't think I'd want to die. However, if on the other hand, I were the fat man, I'm not sure if I'd be willing to sacrifice my own life for the sake of others, which would ultimately benefit the greatest amount of people. I guess what I'm saying is that I sympathize with the fat man, because I don't think he should have to sacrifice his life for the sake of others, but at the same time, I don't think everyone should have to die when there is a possibility for a majority of them to live.

After reading Nielsen's "A Defense of Utilitarianism" and Williams' "Against Utilitarianism", I started thinking about about the pros and cons of the Utilitarian philosophy. While Utilitarianism seems to offer the greatest amount of good or happiness for the greatest amount of people, it seems to remove the person acting from the equation, and therefore distance that person from his or her moral values and beliefs. In The Case of the Innocent Fat Man, for example, if a person were to blow up the fat man he or she would be acting in the best interest of those trapped in the cave, but he or she would be distancing him or herself from his or her moral standpoint not to kill an innocent human being. While Utilitarianism appears to be the philosophy under which the majority of people are taken into account and every action is deliberated with the consequences and the effect on others in view, it seems as though personal moral integrity is threatened by this worldview. Essentially, what I mean by this is that acting in a way that best serves the interested of the maximum amount of people has the capacity to devalue or even contradict one's own moral compass or code. With that being said, another aspect that I found very compelling and that we touched on briefly in class was a quote from Williams' work in which he wrote that "we are not primarily janitors of any system of values, even our own: very often, we just act, as a possible confused result of the situation in which we are engaged". I think that the point that Williams is trying to convey here is that even though we may adhere to a certain moral standard, in a life or death situation we act on instinct and not in accordance with a certain school of virtue.

The Case of the Innocent Fat Man, Utilitarianism, and Negative Responsibility

On page 248 in the Introduction portion of Bernard William's Against Utilitarianism, Williams brings up the notion that "utilitarianism is a bad moral theory because it violates moral integrity," as it often forces one to "reject [one's] conscience and [one's] personal ideals in favor of lesser evils," which he calls negative responsibility. In The Case of the Innocent Fat Man, the second utilitarianism case explored by Nielsen, Nielsen seems to suggest that the killing of one man is morally acceptable given that in doing so, the lives of the other people who are stuck in the cave will be spared. For he says, "our conservative would say...he ought not to blast the fat man out, for it is always wrong to kill the innocent. Must or should a moral man come to that conclusion? I shall argue that he should not." Yet, is this really the case? Is it ever morally acceptable to sacrifice a life, even for the lives of others? If all people are equal and of the same value, then does one's inherent worth depend on the situation one is in? After all, it was not the fat man's fault that he got stuck. In another situation, a skinny person could have fallen victim to another tragedy. And even if it seems reasonable to spare the lives of many instead of the lives of one or two people, wouldn't it still be erronous to say that it was a moral decision to spare the many and kill the few? I would concur with Williams to say that utilitarianism, at least when concerning matters of life and death, makes one choose between a greater and a lesser evil (in The Case of the Innocent Fat Man the death of the fat man is the lesser evil and the death of the others is the greater evil).

Not Really Against Utilitarianism

Bernard Williams has some good points about the shortcomings of utilitarianism in "Against Utilitarianism", but the arguments he uses are off.  His example of George taking the job for biological warfare because he needs employment is not necessarily a good idea or a bad idea.  Williams tries to say utilitarianism is wrong because you can make the wrong decision if you think only of utility, but utilitarianism doesn't mean that you should only look to the utility of it, but you should keep the consequences in perspective.  The consequences could be that George taking the job leads to him becoming immoral in other aspects of his life.  Utilitarianism is a philosophy that recognizes the world isn't black and white and that a decision based on principle alone can easily lead to disastrous consequences.  Disregarding consequences in decision making can be horrific and if any rules are considered too important to ever break, that too can lead to horrific results.  It is wrong to lie, but surely there are cases where it is acceptable.  It's wrong to kill, but what if it's the only way to stop a serial killer?  Consequences should always be kept in mind, but one should be careful not to purely accept them because that can lead to a lack of humanity.  Nielsen emphasized this and he did a great job of explaining how it may be more practical to let something inefficient to happen (such as the mob violence) rather than infringing the law because it could actually lead to a breakdown of the moral structure and legitimacy of the political system of the state.  Utilitarianism does not mean just doing what is most efficient in an individual situation, but rather making sure that you look at the situation and make the right decision based on the real world and not ideal principles.

Who got it right-- Bentham or Mill?

Through the course of reading the utilitarian ideas of Bentham and Mill, an interesting question comes to mind. It is clear that Bentham is focused on the quantity of pleasures attained while Mill focuses on the quality of pleasure. Although Mill's stance may seem most appealing, consider a situation in which a man disregards activities that will have a pleasurable outcome because he sees the activities as not being of good quality. So, rather and have any pleasure for quite some time, the man finally finds an activity which he deems quality enough to purse. This same man then looks for more pleasure of equal or greater quality than his last. It is possible that he never finds it again. To put this example into question form, is one pleasure of good quality worth waiting for and skipping other pleasures of lesser quality?

It has been a long time since Awake to the World was an active blog, and I'm glad to know that it will soon be resuscitated in earnest.  This semester, the students of PHI 390: The Limits of Morality are taking over the blog.

During the first half of the semester, we will survey a number of ethical theories and perspectives, so you can expect conversations about the relative merits of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, among other things.

In the second half of the semester, we will read two contemporary books, each of which poses a threat to some conventional understandings of ethical discourse and moral action.  In Robert Wright's The Moral Animal we will confront the idea that much of our moral action can be explained with reference to evolutionary adaptations, and we will consider what room such an account leaves for moral autonomy and integrity.

In William Easterly's The White Man's Burden, we will take up the question of how well ethical thinking "scales."  That is, we will consider whether ethical theories which generate moral action in individuals can undermine moral action when translated into public policy or collective action.

We hope you'll join us in this important conversation.  All are welcome!