Eros in the Republic - Paul W. Ludwig (Summary by Jordin Post)

Note: Ludwig defines eros as “passionate love or strong lust,” and can cover anything from traditional love (for other humans) to love/lust of an action (love of learning), and philia as "familial affection and friendship" (202) 

The policies Socrates and other interlocutors agree upon for the city regarding that relate to he women and children in book five are hyper regulated to the point where eros exists only to forward political efficiency. The mentality behind these oppressive policies extend back to the soul in book four, where eros is “lumped” with other, lower desires (eg. hunger), a move that Ludwig calls “an insult.” The Republic continues to rub salt in the wound by characterizing the tyrant we find in book nine as being driven solely by eros. The disdain towards eros in the early part of the Republic stands at odds with other Platonic dialogues, and at times, with other parts of the Republic. Ludwig attempts to answer several questions that will sort out the nature of eros in the text and solve these discrepancies. Luckily for us, Ludwig breaks all of his questions and research into three sections in order to make such a broad topic more palpable.

Section I: Tension between Love and Politics?

Here Ludwig tackles the policies Socrates and the others make in the early books of the Republic and create “sexual communism” (203). He takes this section to address the various arguments regarding Plato’s choice to enact it within the city, and to reaffirm that these policies are structured against eros. It is acknowledged by both Ludwig and everyone else he cites in this section that “sexual communism” in the manner that Plato has presented them would never work in a society. The common arguments, showcased by Allan Bloom, as to why they wouldn’t work boil down to two ideas. The first is that reproduction requires a degree of eros in order to be successful. The second is surmised as “heterosexual attraction is so natural in so many people--it just springs up at the sight of a naked body,” meaning that co-ed naked gymnastics are an exercise in futility rather than physical enhancement (205). Ludwig counters both of the arguments and propels his own theory; these policies do not target eros, but the possessiveness that derives from relationships garnered by eros. By removing both serial relationships, and with the reduction of sexual curiosity and mystery (the naked body of the opposite sex is no longer unknown to the young male). While helpful for maintaining the auxiliary class, Ludwig thinks it’s important that the dulling of sexual eros leaves the Guardians with other forms of eros that they can focus on. That might be the point of everything listed in Book Five. 

Ludwig ends section one with a tangent that addresses the concern that Book Five is more about female equality and family than it is about sexuality and eros. He does so handily, but what he adds is useful going into book five. To Ludwig, eros is what connects the three waves of laughter and connects the philosopher king to the issue of naked exercise and sexual communism. “The guardians can purge their eros of the love of their own--giving up any feeling of attachment,” and will treat sex as they treat the other subjects to which their erotic desire gravitates them towards.

Section II: Plato’s Treatment of Greek Cities and Civic Ideologies

Ludwig spends a large swath of the early part of this section linking the policies presented in book five of the Republic to the Spartans, a historical source that Plato likely had at his fingertips. Plato took bits Spartan setup, which benefitted from a cohesiveness achieved by from breaking up the family (taking away the philia-based attachment of a family of one’s own) and replacing it with a homoerotic, eros-based zeal for battle (soldiers fighting harder for their comrades because they love them). Plato then extended the camaraderie to women, and, in order to create a carefully tailored philia, brought back the family aspect but kept it collective. Ludwig asserts that Plato comes out having “ostensibly preserv[ed] the best of both [philiac and erotic incentive structures]” (214).

While Plato’s innovation is lauded by Ludwig, our author doubts the political practicality of the policies. Citing Aristotle, Ludwig believes that philia can only be created when there is a degree of privacy involved. In this case, it would be better if the working class was set through the policies dictated rather than the guardians and auxiliaries. Regarding eros, the argument against the ideas set forth are very similar. Simply put, not everyone is going to be friends, or feel companionship, and the system relies on an attachment to the collective group that isn’t possible. So, as the political excuses to set up the system do not hold up well argumentatively (which may be intentional by Plato), it is necessary to look at educational and philosophical benefits of the system.

Section III: From the Sexual Legislation to the Philosophic Eros

• Note: In order to understand some of this section, knowledge on the Symposium, Phaedrus, and Theætetus is necessary

This section takes on a similar structure to the previous one. Ludwig connects book five of the Republic (beginning at 474b) to various other Platonic dialogues, especially the Symposium. In the Symposium, Diotima warns a young Socrates against monogamy, as the sense of possession he would gain from committing himself to one person would mean “his eros would never be permitted to climb the ladder of love to higher, impersonal objects of eros” (218). Diotima does not discourage Socrates from finding love in “beautiful bodies,” instead advising that “he must establish himself as a lover of all beautiful bodies” (218).

The Republic plays out similarly, with Socrates acting as Diotima and Glaucon now taking on the part of young Socrates. Socrates calls Glaucon’s love of the many parts of many boys erotic in nature, and encourages the behavior. He then attributes this sort of eroticism to the best of the philosophers. Philosophers, after all, love all topics of study and learning itself. The philosopher’s insatiable curiosity, paired with a shamelessness about sharing their ideas [practiced by staying nude all the time] (218) makes them the perfect ruler.

Within the text, this section provides Glaucon and Adeimantus with a reason to talk about topics, like incest, that would usually be shameful and speak their ideas freely. The conversation pilots them--especially our erotic Glaucon--towards becoming a better philosopher.

Section IV. The Eros of the Tyrant and Glaucon’s Ambition

"Why should eros take precedence over thumos--with its aspects of pride, self-assertion and vengefulness--in motivating the tyrannical personality [that we see in book nine]?” As we have discovered in the prior two sections, eros can be viewed from the political perspective, in which eros is bad and must be contained,or it can be viewed philosophically, where eros is praised. Ludwig asserts that Socrates argues the tyrant’s eros from the political perspective--but why?

The answer seems to lie with Glaucon. Socrates caters to playing out the political view because it is what Glaucon has been aiming towards the whole time (224). Most of the arguments from here on in the essay tie to Glaucon. Ludwig blames the tyrant’s uprising to an eros mixed up with thumos, and Glaucon deals heavily with the mix of eros and thumos. He “is both attracted and repulsed by Thrasymachus’ tough talking denigration of justice” (225) and pursues further questioning of it via his spiritedness. It is Glaucon’s ambition that forces Socrates’ change of the Healthy City to the Feverish City. It is, ironically, due to Glaucon’s thumos that the subject of the tripartite soul comes up (226). Thus, Socrates takes book nine to discuss the tyrant as a veiled warning to Glaucon.

The warning surrounds thumos. To Ludwig, thumos functions in two different ways. It adds force to desires and tempers with self-image (to avoid being embarrassed, for example), and, thumos can change self-image to either the degree of not caring about the norm or purposefully creating a self-image to break convention (229). The philosopher’s thumos doesn’t care about its self image and pursues its intellectual desires safely. The tyrant’s thumos grows vengeful against the conventions and seeks to break them, to the negative effect of those around him.

Questions for Ludwig

1. Do we think that Socrates' lesson has reached Glaucon by the end of the Republic? Or is there concern the Glaucon's soul will turn to the nature of the tyrant?

2. Is Socrates' method for imparting this lesson on Glaucon protrepic (as per Yunis' definition?) Does the audience similarly turn itself towards virtue?

3. "Nothing is said about philosophic thumos, if indeed such a thing exists at all" (220)--an innocuous note by Ludwig, but still worthy of questioning. The end of the essay suggests that philosophers have thumos--can we say this is the same as a philosophic thumos?

4. Ludwig seems to take love and appreciation as having the same meaning here (for example, an astronomer cannot appreciate learning as a whole because he has devoted himself to love astronomy). Is this a realistic assumption?

5. If eros is the primary function of the philosopher (in the city analogy), then why is it relegated to the lowest position in the hierarchy of the soul?