"Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic I and 2" by Roslyn Weiss

“Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic I and 2”

Roslyn Weiss

                               

As the title of Roslyn Weiss’ essay indicates, she spends her time analyzing the characters from the Republic I and 2, most notably Thrasymachus, Adeimantus and Glaucon, as well as Socrates and his responses to these interlocutors.

Book 2 of the Republic starts in an interesting place: Socrates believes that he has just shown Thrasymachus what justice is and why it is more profitable than injustice, while Glaucon is not so convinced, claiming Socrates “has offered no proof (apodeixis) regarding either justice or injustice (358b)” (91). But as Weiss points out, Socrates must address the same argument in a completely different way when dealing with Glaucon and Adeimantus rather than Thrasymachus, who “by contrast, did not really want to hear what Socrates had to say; what he wanted was to be heard” (92). Thrasymachus forbids Socrates from defining justice as advantageous - even though, as Socrates acknowledges, Thrasymachus defines justice as “the advantage of the stronger” (339a)) – and he is on the wrong side. Conversely, Adeimantus and Glaucon were on the right side. Weiss also suggests two more possible reasons for Socrates’ willingness to address Glaucon and Adeimantus than their being in the right camp: they demand for him to speak in terms of profitability as it relates to justice in itself, and because they care to hear what Socrates has to say (92). “I argue in what follows that the general account Socrates has already offered, in its essentials, by the end of Book I… contains the core of all he can and will say in the Republic in defense of justice” (93). The task at hand is to define the arguments made by these three men and decide if Socrates does an adequate job of finding justice.

                Weiss makes an interesting comparison when she lines up Thrasymachus with Gorgia’s Callicles: “Both burst into conversations of which they were not initially a part of; both berate Socrates for his deviousness in argument and for his irony; and both are sore losers” (93). For the purpose of Weiss’ argument, the most important attribute comes in a critical difference between the two: who justice serves. Callicles believes that the weak invent justice out of defense for themselves to suppress the strong, while Thrasymachus believes that the strong use justice to oppress the weak. The distinction here is important because “only Thrasymachus’ view makes justice unequivocally bad and unprofitable for those who are conventionally just” (96). 

                The argument that Glaucon presents is in reinforcement to Thrasymachus but it diverges quite a bit. Worth noting is that it was not Glaucon’s opinion, but that of “the many” (99). Weiss acknowledges the former but asks that we focus only on Glaucon’s words rather than opinion. Glacuon’s argument of the many first departs with Thrasymachus over the origin of justice: “Glaucon thinks it originates with the weak who impose it on each other” (100). Second, Weiss highlights Glaucon’s notion that the creation of justice was by those who couldn’t do it well, as to “prevent the suffering of injustice (the worst state) and its commission (the best state)” (100). Third, where Thrasymachus finds justice to be completely retched, Glaucon describes justice as being some middle ground between “the best (doing injustice without suffering it) and the worst (suffering injustice without taking revenge) (359a-b)” (100). Weiss, upon diving into Thrasymachus’ and Glaucon’s arguments then contends that Gorgia’s Polus, a man who believes in the strength of tyranny, may have more in common with Thrasymachus than Callicles, who in fact might line up with Glaucon’s argument more. It is “Glaucon, like Callicles, [who] regards (conventional) justice as an invention of the weak” (100). Although the goals of the weak in their two systems fluctuate slightly, they accomplish the same outcome by default.

                Under Glaucon’s regime, the appearance of justice gains critical importance. Thrasymachus’ strong man needs not worry about appearance because he creates the laws and imposes justice without deception. “Glacuon’s strong man is a “craftsman;” he knows what is possible and what is not. Knowing that not everything is possible, he must employ a whole range of skills to gain the advantages he seeks: he must cultivate good reputation” (101. Upon further inspection, Weiss determines that Glaucon arrives at this conclusion: “So, any way one looks at it, the unjust man, but only as long as he appears just, has a better life than the just man” (102).

                Glaucon’s advantages of the unjust life are shockingly similar to themes already seen in book one. “First, Glaucon notes that the unjust man will be able to rule the city, yet Socrates had contended in his exchange with Thrasymachus that no one rules willingly” (346e) (102). Along with this, the three good things in Book I aligned with justice are, in Glaucon’s speech, aligned with injustice. These good things are sacrifices, helping friends and harming enemies, and partnerships.

                Weiss concisely defines Adeimantus’ supplement to his brother’s argument when she says, “Adeimantus contends, is not what those who praise injustice say against it but what those who praise justice say in its favor” (103). This of course, alluding to Adeimantus’ concern with the appearance of justice. If an unjust man can appear just, get the rewards of justice and can buy back the god’s favor, why not do this? “According to Adeimantus, those most susceptible to this corrosive idea are young people ‘with good natures,’ those who are clever and not easily duped… [they] see no advantage in justice… and since they regard the life of justice as a hard one, they determine the life of appearing just to be by far the better. To be sure, even this life is not easy (365d), but since it is the happy one it is worth the effort” (104). A long passage from Weiss here, but a lot of good details. It describes who is sympathetic and practicing Adeimantus’ appearance argument and why. Weiss’ last big take away from Adeimantus, is his combing of the arguments, “He recognizes, to be sure, as Thrasymachus did not, that the unjust will have to work to appear just, but since what he did not see is that in this way, justice serves the weak and constrains the strong, he conflates the two views he has heard” (103).

                So why go through these arguments? Socrates has, as Weiss points out, said all of the big picture concepts of justice in Book I. Why push him with more arguments? What is it that the interlocutors want Socrates to say? Weiss has already said why Socrates might have been more willing to address Glaucon and Adeimantus, which included their wanting to know Socrates’ opinion, but they want Socrates to define justice in “in itself” and “apart from its wages and consequences” (357b-c). If justice is in the soul, why is that person better than if there were injustice there? “Both men are far more interested in learning what justice and injust are (358b), why being just is all by itself good for a man and injustice bad, why ‘in doing injustice [a man] would dwell with the greatest evil’ (367a), and what injustice and justice do to the man who has them (367b and 367e) – as opposed to what they procure for him” (107).

                Socrates’ defense of justice starts with Thrasymachus, who contends that it is the advantageous of the strong. Socrates doesn’t disagree that justice is advantageous, but he contends that it is always for the sake of the ruled. Weiss spends most of the time pursing the philosopher in Socrates’ argument. “The philosopher is suited to rule on account of his wisdom but that he is not unwilling to rule, despite the fact that ruling is beneficial not to himself but to others, can be attributed only to his justice” (108). Putting things into context Weiss highlights three points that Socrates makes here: first, to prove to Adeimantus that philosophers are practical in use. Second, it highlights the importance of a regime that the philosopher is in, which can oppress him or it can help himself - and the city - can grow. “But third, and most important, Socrates says nothing to indicate that philosophers, even in a suitable regime, would want to rule, or would find in ruling anything other than drudgery” (109). The only suitable reason for a philosopher to rule is “he has discovered a better place and a better way to live, and from the affairs of human beings” (517c).

                Weiss also clarifies something that Socrates is intentionally vague about, the difference between being just and acting justly. “It is being just, having the condition of justice in one’s soul, that appeals… Glaucon placed justice – doing just acts – in the class of beneficial drudgery (358a)” (112) – the third kind of good, in which it is beneficial for what it produces. So doing justice is good for its consequences in that it leads to justice in the soul, or a healthy soul, which is desirable in itself, as well as producing what Socrates coins as “harmony,” harmony within themselves, with others, and with the gods. It is a self-less justice because it benefits those around the just philosopher; but the philosopher surely will not be upset with the lower crime rate and economic success as a result of the ruler bringing harmony.

Questions:

   1)   Why do you think Socrates feels responsible to defend justice? As Weiss claims, much of what he claims after his first go about simply expands off of Book I

  2)  Why do you think Adeimantus is so eager to pick up his brother’s argument? What does his argument do that Glaucon’s didn’t?

    3)  Weiss feels that Socrates treats Glaucon and Adeimantus differently than Thrasymachus because they have a similar opinion to him. Why do you think Plato would do this? How might the Greeks who first read this have responded to this – especially the “clever, not easily duped” youth who were actively living by Adeimantus’ argument?

     4)  In Thrasymachus’ argument justice is completely wretched, whereas “Glaucons describes Justice as ‘pleasing’ (359a) and as ‘honored’ (359b) as a mean between the best (doing injustice without suffering it) and the worst (suffering injustice without taking revenge)” (359a-b) (100). What do you make of this? Think about the role of moderation/mean in ancient Greece.

  5)  Are you convinced by Weiss’ conclusion of Socrates’ argument, that justice is largely based on the benefits the good rulers bestow on the ruled? Would you want to be the ruler? If you had the ability (ie; were a philosopher full of wisdom), would you feel compelled to rule?