The Case of the Innocent Fat Man, Utilitarianism, and Negative Responsibility

On page 248 in the Introduction portion of Bernard William's Against Utilitarianism, Williams brings up the notion that "utilitarianism is a bad moral theory because it violates moral integrity," as it often forces one to "reject [one's] conscience and [one's] personal ideals in favor of lesser evils," which he calls negative responsibility. In The Case of the Innocent Fat Man, the second utilitarianism case explored by Nielsen, Nielsen seems to suggest that the killing of one man is morally acceptable given that in doing so, the lives of the other people who are stuck in the cave will be spared. For he says, "our conservative would say...he ought not to blast the fat man out, for it is always wrong to kill the innocent. Must or should a moral man come to that conclusion? I shall argue that he should not." Yet, is this really the case? Is it ever morally acceptable to sacrifice a life, even for the lives of others? If all people are equal and of the same value, then does one's inherent worth depend on the situation one is in? After all, it was not the fat man's fault that he got stuck. In another situation, a skinny person could have fallen victim to another tragedy. And even if it seems reasonable to spare the lives of many instead of the lives of one or two people, wouldn't it still be erronous to say that it was a moral decision to spare the many and kill the few? I would concur with Williams to say that utilitarianism, at least when concerning matters of life and death, makes one choose between a greater and a lesser evil (in The Case of the Innocent Fat Man the death of the fat man is the lesser evil and the death of the others is the greater evil).

Not Really Against Utilitarianism

Bernard Williams has some good points about the shortcomings of utilitarianism in "Against Utilitarianism", but the arguments he uses are off.  His example of George taking the job for biological warfare because he needs employment is not necessarily a good idea or a bad idea.  Williams tries to say utilitarianism is wrong because you can make the wrong decision if you think only of utility, but utilitarianism doesn't mean that you should only look to the utility of it, but you should keep the consequences in perspective.  The consequences could be that George taking the job leads to him becoming immoral in other aspects of his life.  Utilitarianism is a philosophy that recognizes the world isn't black and white and that a decision based on principle alone can easily lead to disastrous consequences.  Disregarding consequences in decision making can be horrific and if any rules are considered too important to ever break, that too can lead to horrific results.  It is wrong to lie, but surely there are cases where it is acceptable.  It's wrong to kill, but what if it's the only way to stop a serial killer?  Consequences should always be kept in mind, but one should be careful not to purely accept them because that can lead to a lack of humanity.  Nielsen emphasized this and he did a great job of explaining how it may be more practical to let something inefficient to happen (such as the mob violence) rather than infringing the law because it could actually lead to a breakdown of the moral structure and legitimacy of the political system of the state.  Utilitarianism does not mean just doing what is most efficient in an individual situation, but rather making sure that you look at the situation and make the right decision based on the real world and not ideal principles.

Who got it right-- Bentham or Mill?

Through the course of reading the utilitarian ideas of Bentham and Mill, an interesting question comes to mind. It is clear that Bentham is focused on the quantity of pleasures attained while Mill focuses on the quality of pleasure. Although Mill's stance may seem most appealing, consider a situation in which a man disregards activities that will have a pleasurable outcome because he sees the activities as not being of good quality. So, rather and have any pleasure for quite some time, the man finally finds an activity which he deems quality enough to purse. This same man then looks for more pleasure of equal or greater quality than his last. It is possible that he never finds it again. To put this example into question form, is one pleasure of good quality worth waiting for and skipping other pleasures of lesser quality?

It has been a long time since Awake to the World was an active blog, and I'm glad to know that it will soon be resuscitated in earnest.  This semester, the students of PHI 390: The Limits of Morality are taking over the blog.

During the first half of the semester, we will survey a number of ethical theories and perspectives, so you can expect conversations about the relative merits of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, among other things.

In the second half of the semester, we will read two contemporary books, each of which poses a threat to some conventional understandings of ethical discourse and moral action.  In Robert Wright's The Moral Animal we will confront the idea that much of our moral action can be explained with reference to evolutionary adaptations, and we will consider what room such an account leaves for moral autonomy and integrity.

In William Easterly's The White Man's Burden, we will take up the question of how well ethical thinking "scales."  That is, we will consider whether ethical theories which generate moral action in individuals can undermine moral action when translated into public policy or collective action.

We hope you'll join us in this important conversation.  All are welcome!

Parmenides

Parmenides is one of the hardest Plato texts that I have read up to this date. In the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates challenges Zeno/Parmenides view on "the one"; Zeno/Parmenides believes that it is absurd for anyone to believe in the view of plurality of beings. That is, it is impossible for things to be both like and unlike (along with many other terms that are contrary by nature). While discussing what "the one" would be, Parmenides goes through many contradictory statements to discuss what "the one" isn't; by doing this, he is providing a reductio ad absurdum argument for what the "one" is by discussing what it couldn't possibly be. The Reductio ad absurdum argument is used in Aristotle's Metaphysics book to account for logical forms that don't appear valid at first glance.

Yet, the reductio ad absurdum does not necessarily provide new information about the concept at hand; instead, this line of argument to me is only able to express what the item isn't.
It seems that this tool of reductio ad absurdum works well when it isn't fully examined by a keen philosophical mind; that is, as a tool for persuasion, it works very well. It compares two concepts, one particular concept in a negative light and the other idea in a more positive light; it attempts to prove that the idea in the positive is the only logical conclusion left after the validity of the other concept has been proven false.

I look back on Parmenides' argument of oneness and it seems that his line of reasoning still leaves other possibilities; I do not feel satisfied with the results that arise out of the argument simply because they conclude out necessity with few alternatives that might still be possible.

I believe that we (collectively as a society), still use this type of reasoning (even though it can be fallacious) to a certain degree. We still forget to look for more alternatives to the conclusion we quickly arise to; that is, in any given situation, I believe that although there is only one possible conclusion that is valid, it is still possible for a conclusion to arise out of premises that is invalid; not because of a flaw in the argument, but by not introducing enough facts to arise to the correct conclusion. In the case of describing how things relate to one another, I believe that we are simply unable to capture even one quality or concept of all the possible things in this world (universe, space outside that universe, etc. to infinite).

Still, I must commend Plato's attempt to reconcile all the things of this earth in his theories of forms so that philosophers might know all instances of a form by knowing the form itself.

In Phaedo Socrates commits suicide; he infers various reasons why philosophers should not fear death but welcome it as well. Is suicide than a reasonable act? Some might surmise that he did not have a choice in the matter since he was sentenced to death, and it was also decided that he should die this way. My question is than as follow is Socrates willingness to die any less a suicide?

I might agree with the idea that Socrates acceptance of his condemnation is a testament to his beliefs that justice should be according to those elected to give it. Those who condemned him however did fit Socrates description of wise. They were not philosopher kings or philosophers at all because if they were I am assuming Socrates would never have been put on trial. Where than is the logic behind Socrates’ suicide? Doesn’t that very act undermine his thoughts on our nature?

I remain adamant that Socrates had a choice; he could have refused to commit suicide. In his refusal he would have defended all his views amongst which are the one that suicide no matter the circumstance is wrong. Isn’t fighting for one’s belief more important than yielding to the wishes of others especially when it compromises who we are? Socrates wish to die and his elation towards the end is no different to me than those committing suicide to escape the pain of being alive. Unless of course Socrates meant that suicide is acceptable base on circumstances.

Parmenides: The One

I would like to continue this discussion about the forms and this description of “the one” in Parmenides. First, I would like to conclude that the forms and “the one” are the same thing because the context seems to imply that this is the case even though it is not explicit despite the passage that seems to separate the two things. However, in making this conclusion, as brought up in class, how do we explain that more than one thing can embody the same form if it (the form) is one and cannot be divided? Could we offer the conclusion that more than one thing is a reflection of a form but does not acquire an actual piece of that form? Or should we go with Socrates' theory of the sunlight? Or should we conclude the theory of the sail that was proposed in the text? I would like to propose my personal theory that I just mentioned regarding a reflection. Perhaps each form is like a mirror. A mirror is able to reflect multiple different things at one time without being divided. Also, in terms of being in parts or being a whole, the mirror analogy also fits well. I would like to argue that forms do not have parts. Forms, like a mirror, do not require to be in parts to reflect, or to embody multiple things.

Now, in terms of "the one" being in neither in rest or in motion as discussed in Parmenides, how does that come to be is the big question. One automatically assumes that if something is not in rest, then it is in motion, and if it is not in motion, then it is in rest. It seems that it is only two options here and no between. However, maybe one could suggest that it is in this state of becoming in which it was in this state of rest and is becoming in motion, or it was in motion and is becoming at rest. In other words, it is in neither rest or motion because it is in its becoming stage. However, there is never any indication by the text that it will ever reach a state of rest or motion, so if we go with my theory, then the one will always remain in the becoming stages of being in motion or in rest.

What can Parmenides tell us about Being?

What can Parminedes tell us about being? He offers a description and gives a few arguments. He argues that being is eternal and being cannot come into being and also that it cannot go out of being. Being cannot come into being because the problem would then become where did it come from. So if being were to come into being then it would have to come from something that is not being. And also, what is non being? Parminedes says that non being cannot be a concept. Another thing is that being cannot go out of being because then where would it go? I think that this is where Parmenides gets his concept of eternal from.

Parmenides also claims that being is indivisible, that it cannot be divided into parts. Being is one, according to Parmenides. If being were to have parts then we would have to say that this one thing is a part of being and this other thing is a part of being, etc. I mean, with the example from my hand on my body. I know that my hand is different than my foot, right? My hand is not my foot. But with being this concept is difficult because we cannot say something like “not being” because Parmenides rules out the concept of not being. From this Parminedes concludes that being is one.

From this I am assuming that Parmenides is referring to reality being one. I think Parmenides is a genius.

Theory about Plato

I was thinking that maybe the reason why Plato never answers any of his questions in a more direct manner is because he does not want to influence our answers. While he tries to teach us the right way to think about a topic and guide us towards certain topics worth exploring, he does not impose us his ideologies. Reading his works separately I will admit is not an easy task; relating them under one umbrella however, for me particularly, make all his ideas more sensible.

While Plato seems to specifically dissect the human soul in the republic; I have come to believe that most of his works have one specific goal to analyze the different parts of human nature, and to help individually define who we are. The books that we’ve covered thus far examined virtue, perception, justice etc; they all have a common thread and its man’s true nature.

Is it possible that Plato knew the answers to the questions he sought? Is it possible that he did not answer them to give our own conclusion a sense of individuality? I know of course that it is probably a possibility I’d be grateful to know why exactly it would be a plausible theory?

Plato: Godfather of Soul

I believe that at this point, I could portray fairly accurately the model of the soul for Socrates. Firstly, the soul is immortal, unable to be broken, and exists in an immaterial sense. It is the master of the body (not vice-versa), yet can still be influenced by bodily pleasures. It leaves the body upon death (in a sense, it causes the death of the body and causes the life of a new body) and goes into the realm of forms where it commutes with all forms and gains all possible knowledge. Aside from all of this, I am interested as to where the soul originated.

In the Timeaus, there are two accounts given of the creation of earth: the first account is that of the Intellectual and the second account being that of Necessity.  I am particularly curious about the second account's claim that there are three things that existed even before the universe existed (out of necessity): being, becoming, and space. I am curious as to how the soul would exist in one of these three conditions if it were to exist before the universe came to be* (for lack of a better word). If the soul were to exist as being, then it would be unable to change; that is, it wouldn't change from one body to the next, or change from the material realm to the form realm. If the soul were to exist as becoming, it is necessary that it would always be changing and becoming. This condition would render the soul as being made and then destroyed constantly if this cycle were to come close to being in the infinite nature of the soul. But this wouldn't be the same soul in a sense, it would be a new soul created and destroyed each time. Yet, surely, the soul doesn't exist in space which is to be understand as simply the place for something to be or become.

If I am to salvage the image of the soul for me, I'm left to consider a few new possibilities: a) the soul might not be immortal, b) the soul has a part that is immortal and a part that isn't immortal (one part that is being and another part that is becomming), or c) the soul came after the universe was made. In the nature of Socrates, I wish to maintain that the soul is immortal; however, I wish to shine light on the fact that Socrates has proposed a model of the soul that contained different parts that were constituted an entire soul. Perhaps, in a sense, it is possible to present this model altered for our purposes. Perhaps the soul is that which is composed of both being and becoming at once; that is, perhaps it has a certain nature of actualization (to coin Aristotle) and a nature of potentiality. The soul would have two distinct parts that constitute a sense of worldly being that is constantly becoming something new so as to correspond to the world in flux and it would have a part that always is the same and doesn't change to the world. To think of this graphically, the part of being (not changing) would be like the center with the part of becoming (changing) on the outside.
Yet, even with this model, I'm afraid that more problems arise; is it possible to both be and to also become? If this is so, there would be no necessity for the soul to enter the body to be its master (if it has the power to actualize all at once with no body).

Final thought: the soul of the world must have come after the universe existed, or at the same time by both necessity and by wordily definition. If the soul of the world came after the universe existed, then it seems to follow by sub-alternation that the souls of people came afterward as well.