Final Paper

Analogy of the Divided Plato/Socrates

Farah Rafi
“I know one thing: that I know nothing” – Socrates

     Throughout the Republic of Plato, the audience is led to believe that Socrates has understood the true meaning of justice because he is able to explain it to the other interlocutors. He defines justice in Book Four and is prepared to jump right into the topic of injustice before he is interrupted by Adeimantus, which results in a three book detour on the nature of understanding. According to David K. O’Connor in his essay on “Rewriting the Poets in Plato’s Characters”, there is an ambiguity about whether or not Socrates has actually made it out of the cave towards a greater understanding. In fact, Plato toys with us about whether or not his teacher has reached the highest level of the Divided Line that is the Good when Socrates is asked to define what the Good is in Book Six. However, even though Book Six is the first time we are introduced to the Analogy of the Divided Line, much of the concepts outlined in the diagram can be echoed in the very words spoken between Plato’s interlocutors. And perhaps it is these subtle clues of the opinions versus the understanding that can help us to uncover the mystery of where the divide between Plato and Socrates is and maybe even where Socrates lies on the Divided Line.
      The Analogy of the Divided Line draws a sharp and an unequal division between the visible world of opinion and the intelligible realm of knowledge. Socrates places images and perceptions in the state of opinion because, at that stage, we do not have the knowledge to understand why we perceive certain things the way that we do, only that we do indeed perceive them (509d-510a). He goes on further to say that mathematical reasoning, which includes hypotheses, and the Forms, which exemplify absolute understanding, which are what constitute the world of knowledge, because they are concepts that we must look at beyond what our eyes can conceive to be true (510b-511d). The Analogy of the Sun makes the claim that just as we need the sun in order for our eyes to see all that is visible, we need the Good in order to understand all that is intelligible, or in a sense, “invisible” (508c). Socrates even tells Glaucon in Book Five that opinion lies between ignorance and knowledge.
     The Analogy of the Divided Line has been seen in many aspects of the dialogue. The city-soul analogy proposed in Book 2 is a clear demonstration of the solid divide between that which is human opinion and understanding. The soul is an immaterial concept that can be difficult to process because we cannot see it whereas a city is a concrete idea that most of us are familiar with. In fact, after Glaucon and Adeimantus’ present their challenge to Socrates, Plato makes the point to alert the audience that he, meaning Socrates, was “speaking his opinion” in regards to how to proceed with defining justice in the soul. “Glaucon and the others begged me in every way to help out and not to give up the argument but rather to seek out what each is and the truth about the benefit of both. So I spoke my opinion” (368c). This represents one of the few moments in which Plato/Socrates is speaking directly to the readers, outside of the usual dialogue. Socrates then proceeds to say, “It looks to me as though the investigation we are undertaking is no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply. Since we’re not clever men, in my opinion, we should make this kind of investigation of it -” (368c). This suggests that none of the interlocutors at that moment are able to understand the idea of justice in the soul without first being able to visualize it in a city (368c-e). Socrates even goes so far as to say “we are not clever men”, implying that he too does not have a full understanding of justice in the soul due to his initial claim that he is not “capable” of such an argument. Arguably, it could be the opposite as well, that Socrates has reached the full understanding (the Good) but must make his way down (back into the cave) and back up again, similar to the Myth of Er.
      The irony in this is that, as early as Book 3, Socrates condemns the concept of opinions because of their constantly changing nature when talking about the ruler of the just city, who should not be easily influenced by opinions (413a-e). He later revisits the idea of opinions when speaking with Adeimantus about the Good in Book 6, where he reprimands Adeimantus for wanting to hear other people’s opinions on things of which they know little about, and of course Socrates is referring to himself (506b-d). His initial attempt to evade defining what the Good is causes some uncertainty about whether or not he actually knows what it is, implying that his definition would be that of opinion and not actual fact. Perhaps this is Plato telling us that Socrates does not know fully what the Good is or he does, but similar to his approach to justice, he believes that the argument would be too difficult to be understood by the interlocutors. Another possibility is that this is Plato saying that he himself cannot mimic the voice of his mentor in this endeavor, at least to the full extent of Socrates. The quote stated before about Socrates stating his opinion is one of the few moments in the Republic that is not dialogue. At this point Plato’s Socrates is speaking directly to the audience. Plato is caught contradicting himself in Book 3 when he, as Socrates, denounces the act of imitation due to the fact that it is inauthentic yet the entire dialogue is in fact him attempting to imitate/ personify the voice of his teacher. Perhaps this passage represents Plato reminding the audience that the interlocutor about to delve into the definition of justice in the soul is actually a personification created by Plato. The Socrates that drives the dialogue is visible form of the intelligible Plato.
     The phrase “in my opinion” has been used about eighty-five times in the Bloom translation of the Republic of Plato, a third of which were spoken by Socrates himself. I found it incredibly interesting that someone who condemns opinions in such a manner would then turn and use his own opinion in order to drive the dialogue. But perhaps this contradiction signals to another meaning. Socrates’ assertion of his opinions often occurs in rather important scenarios. For example, in Book Four, Socrates tells Glaucon: “Well, it’s wisdom, in my opinion, which first comes plainly to light in it. And something about it looks strange. The city we described is really wise, in my opinion (428b).” He also states his opinion when Glaucon suggests the luxurious city in place of the healthy city, which Socrates believed, in his opinion, was the just city. Why is it that Plato chose these specific points in the dialogue to invoke Socrates’ opinions? According to the novel Plato’s Socrates, written by Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, Socrates’ interjections of his opinions provides proof of what they call the Paradox of Socrates’ Ignorance. “On the one hand, Socrates frequently proclaims his own ignorance, on the other, he occasionally, but quite explicitly, claims to know something and even more often appears to assert opinions with the utmost confidence” (Brickhouse and Smith, pg. 30). While I don’t believe that Socrates’ opinions manifest ignorance, they do seem to play an interesting role in how the audience views Plato’s Socrates. I believe this is because Plato is telling the audience that this is his opinion of the Socrates that he has created. He reminds us that the Socrates who is narrating the dialogue is a creation of his imagination and his perception of his teacher and that while the interactions between these interlocutors may or may not have taken place, the dialogue itself was all documented by Plato and much of it may have been exaggerations of the initial interactions (if it even happened at all…). “Perhaps Plato is not always careful to provide Socrates with a consistent position. Perhaps Socrates gets caught up in his own rhetoric and exaggerates his real views. Perhaps he is occasionally confused. But one should not too easily be discouraged by the appearance of the paradox; something important might be at work beneath it, which once seen would both dissolve the appearance of inconsistency and edify the one who got beyond that appearance” (Brickhouse and Smith, p. 30). The paradox of ignorance and knowledge provide the framework for the divided line with opinion lying in the middle. The inconsistencies that Socrates displays throughout the Republic manifest one of the greatest examples of the divide between Plato and Socrates.
I mentioned in the introduction that there are clues in the dialogue between Plato’s interlocutors regarding Socrates’ placement on the divided line. The Allegory of the Cave puts into context the journey that one would take from the bottom of the Divided Line (ignorance/the bottom of the cave) to the top (knowledge/out of the cave) where, in order for one of the prisoners to leave the cave, they would have to be forcefully taken up towards the light, meaning against their will. Socrates is initially unwilling to accept the challenge of proving justice superior to injustice as well as task of providing a definition of the Good, but is persuaded by Glaucon and Adeimantus to pursue these endeavors; however, he must first create visual metaphors in order to put his argument into perspective for himself and others to follow. In doing so, he is either saying that he is unwise or we are or quite possibly both.  But the evidence that Socrates is helping the interlocutors (we the stupid people) on this journey from the bottom of the Divided Line/the Cave can be seen when he inquires his fellow interlocutors about their own opinions almost as if to say “do you perceive what I am saying”. By asking the question “in your opinion…”, Socrates brings the philosophies down to a level in which the interlocutors (and us) can understand them through perceptions of what we already know. “Socrates has an astonishing capacity to discern ignorance and confusion in others. He feigns ignorance merely to bait his interlocutors into answering his questions – questions he knows will lead his interlocutors into confusion and self-contradiction” (Brickhouse and Smith, p. 32). He uses the Socratic Method in order to induce critical thinking about the concepts through interactive teaching rather than simply laying them out in plain lecture. For example, in his argument with Thrasymachus, Socrates asks for his opinion about whether “there is still some work that belongs to a horse” which leads Thrasymachus to say that he does not understand. Socrates proceeds to break the argument down further to the point that Thrasymachus can follow (and eventually get defeated) (352d-353c).This inquiry of the other interlocutors creates the allusion that Socrates is in fact higher on the Divided Line and is trying to lead others towards higher understanding by checking to see if they are following what he says. Or at least it may be what Plato believes. Interestingly enough, the only time when Socrates does not inquire about another’s opinion is during the entirety of Book 8.
Interestingly enough, Socrates invokes his opinions far more often than he invokes his knowledge. According to the Analogy of the Divided Line, mathematical reasoning and the Forms are what constitute the realm of knowledge, the intelligible. “For Knowledge has the two subspecies of ‘thought’ and ‘intellect’; and thought is, in respect to clarity and truth, inferior to intellect” (Denyer, p.292). If thought is higher than opinion, shouldn’t someone like Socrates invoke what he thinks rather than what he opines? Socrates states his thoughts in several key points in the dialogue, similar to his opinions. One instance in which Socrates speaks his thoughts occurs in Book IV when he talks about courage and preservation. “The preserving of the opinion produced by law through education about what is terrible. And by preserving through everything I meant preserving that opinion and not casting it out in pains and pleasures and desires and fears. If you wish I’m willing to compare it to what I think it’s like” (429d). Socrates goes on to compare preservation and education with dye, stating that without proper care and preparation the colors will washout and the shirt will look ridiculous, referring to the guardians and auxiliary education. He shows a higher level of understanding through comparison. Another example of when Socrates raises his thoughts occurs in Book One. “I must tell you that for my part I am not persuaded; nor do I think injustice is more profitable than justice” (345a). In response to Thrasymachus’ claim that injustice is superior to justice, Socrates crosses over from the world of opinion into the intelligible when he retorts this unfounded claim by giving his thoughts. It is this claim that would later drive the rest of the dialogue and it is interesting that Socrates does not say “nor in my opinion is injustice more profitable than justice”. By invoking his thoughts, Socrates, or rather Plato, seems to be setting the stage for what is to come in the rest of the dialogue as the first instance when Socrates speaks his thoughts was in regards to Thrasymachus’ verbal assault on Socrates’ method of questioning. “I was astounded when I heard him, and, looking at him, I was frightened. I think that if I had not seen him before he saw me, I would have been speechless” (336d). Once again, it seems that Plato is speaking directly to the readers as this line was not part of dialogue. One could argue that Thrasymachus set the stage for the rest of the Republic and thus his argument was the only one that Plato really wanted to highlight. Despite the interlocutor being an imitation of his teacher, Plato displays an understanding about Socrates and how he would respond to someone like Thrasymachus to the point that he would confidently have Socrates speak what he was thinking.
The entirety of the Republic of Plato is a dialogue of imitation, which makes it difficult to separate the voice of Plato from the voice of Socrates. One of the biggest questions remains whether or not Socrates has actually reached the end of the Divided Line or if Plato himself is unaware of whether or not his teacher made it out of the cave. The Divided Line separates opinion from knowledge, where opinion is limited to perception and imagination and not actual thought. Plato uses this division several times in the dialogue as a way to remind the audience that the Socrates narrating the Republic is one created by Plato, by means of the very words uttered by the interlocutor when stating his opinions about core concepts. Although Plato does contradict himself at times, he leaves subtle hints about his theory of Socrates’ wisdom and knowledge, and while we may never know if Socrates made it out of the cave, Plato’s use of his mentor’s voice sheds a bit of light on the divide between Plato and the Socrates that he created.

Works Cited

Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Smith, Nicholas D. Plato’s Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press, (1994): 30-32. Online Book. May 8, 2016.

Denyer, Nicholas. “Sun and Line: The Role of the Good”. Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic. New York: Cambridge University Press (2007). 284-309. Print.

Plato and Allan Bloom. The Republic of Plato. 2nd edition. New York: Basic (1991). Print.