"Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic I and 2" by Roslyn Weiss

“Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic I and 2”

Roslyn Weiss

                               

As the title of Roslyn Weiss’ essay indicates, she spends her time analyzing the characters from the Republic I and 2, most notably Thrasymachus, Adeimantus and Glaucon, as well as Socrates and his responses to these interlocutors.

Book 2 of the Republic starts in an interesting place: Socrates believes that he has just shown Thrasymachus what justice is and why it is more profitable than injustice, while Glaucon is not so convinced, claiming Socrates “has offered no proof (apodeixis) regarding either justice or injustice (358b)” (91). But as Weiss points out, Socrates must address the same argument in a completely different way when dealing with Glaucon and Adeimantus rather than Thrasymachus, who “by contrast, did not really want to hear what Socrates had to say; what he wanted was to be heard” (92). Thrasymachus forbids Socrates from defining justice as advantageous - even though, as Socrates acknowledges, Thrasymachus defines justice as “the advantage of the stronger” (339a)) – and he is on the wrong side. Conversely, Adeimantus and Glaucon were on the right side. Weiss also suggests two more possible reasons for Socrates’ willingness to address Glaucon and Adeimantus than their being in the right camp: they demand for him to speak in terms of profitability as it relates to justice in itself, and because they care to hear what Socrates has to say (92). “I argue in what follows that the general account Socrates has already offered, in its essentials, by the end of Book I… contains the core of all he can and will say in the Republic in defense of justice” (93). The task at hand is to define the arguments made by these three men and decide if Socrates does an adequate job of finding justice.

                Weiss makes an interesting comparison when she lines up Thrasymachus with Gorgia’s Callicles: “Both burst into conversations of which they were not initially a part of; both berate Socrates for his deviousness in argument and for his irony; and both are sore losers” (93). For the purpose of Weiss’ argument, the most important attribute comes in a critical difference between the two: who justice serves. Callicles believes that the weak invent justice out of defense for themselves to suppress the strong, while Thrasymachus believes that the strong use justice to oppress the weak. The distinction here is important because “only Thrasymachus’ view makes justice unequivocally bad and unprofitable for those who are conventionally just” (96). 

                The argument that Glaucon presents is in reinforcement to Thrasymachus but it diverges quite a bit. Worth noting is that it was not Glaucon’s opinion, but that of “the many” (99). Weiss acknowledges the former but asks that we focus only on Glaucon’s words rather than opinion. Glacuon’s argument of the many first departs with Thrasymachus over the origin of justice: “Glaucon thinks it originates with the weak who impose it on each other” (100). Second, Weiss highlights Glaucon’s notion that the creation of justice was by those who couldn’t do it well, as to “prevent the suffering of injustice (the worst state) and its commission (the best state)” (100). Third, where Thrasymachus finds justice to be completely retched, Glaucon describes justice as being some middle ground between “the best (doing injustice without suffering it) and the worst (suffering injustice without taking revenge) (359a-b)” (100). Weiss, upon diving into Thrasymachus’ and Glaucon’s arguments then contends that Gorgia’s Polus, a man who believes in the strength of tyranny, may have more in common with Thrasymachus than Callicles, who in fact might line up with Glaucon’s argument more. It is “Glaucon, like Callicles, [who] regards (conventional) justice as an invention of the weak” (100). Although the goals of the weak in their two systems fluctuate slightly, they accomplish the same outcome by default.

                Under Glaucon’s regime, the appearance of justice gains critical importance. Thrasymachus’ strong man needs not worry about appearance because he creates the laws and imposes justice without deception. “Glacuon’s strong man is a “craftsman;” he knows what is possible and what is not. Knowing that not everything is possible, he must employ a whole range of skills to gain the advantages he seeks: he must cultivate good reputation” (101. Upon further inspection, Weiss determines that Glaucon arrives at this conclusion: “So, any way one looks at it, the unjust man, but only as long as he appears just, has a better life than the just man” (102).

                Glaucon’s advantages of the unjust life are shockingly similar to themes already seen in book one. “First, Glaucon notes that the unjust man will be able to rule the city, yet Socrates had contended in his exchange with Thrasymachus that no one rules willingly” (346e) (102). Along with this, the three good things in Book I aligned with justice are, in Glaucon’s speech, aligned with injustice. These good things are sacrifices, helping friends and harming enemies, and partnerships.

                Weiss concisely defines Adeimantus’ supplement to his brother’s argument when she says, “Adeimantus contends, is not what those who praise injustice say against it but what those who praise justice say in its favor” (103). This of course, alluding to Adeimantus’ concern with the appearance of justice. If an unjust man can appear just, get the rewards of justice and can buy back the god’s favor, why not do this? “According to Adeimantus, those most susceptible to this corrosive idea are young people ‘with good natures,’ those who are clever and not easily duped… [they] see no advantage in justice… and since they regard the life of justice as a hard one, they determine the life of appearing just to be by far the better. To be sure, even this life is not easy (365d), but since it is the happy one it is worth the effort” (104). A long passage from Weiss here, but a lot of good details. It describes who is sympathetic and practicing Adeimantus’ appearance argument and why. Weiss’ last big take away from Adeimantus, is his combing of the arguments, “He recognizes, to be sure, as Thrasymachus did not, that the unjust will have to work to appear just, but since what he did not see is that in this way, justice serves the weak and constrains the strong, he conflates the two views he has heard” (103).

                So why go through these arguments? Socrates has, as Weiss points out, said all of the big picture concepts of justice in Book I. Why push him with more arguments? What is it that the interlocutors want Socrates to say? Weiss has already said why Socrates might have been more willing to address Glaucon and Adeimantus, which included their wanting to know Socrates’ opinion, but they want Socrates to define justice in “in itself” and “apart from its wages and consequences” (357b-c). If justice is in the soul, why is that person better than if there were injustice there? “Both men are far more interested in learning what justice and injust are (358b), why being just is all by itself good for a man and injustice bad, why ‘in doing injustice [a man] would dwell with the greatest evil’ (367a), and what injustice and justice do to the man who has them (367b and 367e) – as opposed to what they procure for him” (107).

                Socrates’ defense of justice starts with Thrasymachus, who contends that it is the advantageous of the strong. Socrates doesn’t disagree that justice is advantageous, but he contends that it is always for the sake of the ruled. Weiss spends most of the time pursing the philosopher in Socrates’ argument. “The philosopher is suited to rule on account of his wisdom but that he is not unwilling to rule, despite the fact that ruling is beneficial not to himself but to others, can be attributed only to his justice” (108). Putting things into context Weiss highlights three points that Socrates makes here: first, to prove to Adeimantus that philosophers are practical in use. Second, it highlights the importance of a regime that the philosopher is in, which can oppress him or it can help himself - and the city - can grow. “But third, and most important, Socrates says nothing to indicate that philosophers, even in a suitable regime, would want to rule, or would find in ruling anything other than drudgery” (109). The only suitable reason for a philosopher to rule is “he has discovered a better place and a better way to live, and from the affairs of human beings” (517c).

                Weiss also clarifies something that Socrates is intentionally vague about, the difference between being just and acting justly. “It is being just, having the condition of justice in one’s soul, that appeals… Glaucon placed justice – doing just acts – in the class of beneficial drudgery (358a)” (112) – the third kind of good, in which it is beneficial for what it produces. So doing justice is good for its consequences in that it leads to justice in the soul, or a healthy soul, which is desirable in itself, as well as producing what Socrates coins as “harmony,” harmony within themselves, with others, and with the gods. It is a self-less justice because it benefits those around the just philosopher; but the philosopher surely will not be upset with the lower crime rate and economic success as a result of the ruler bringing harmony.

Questions:

   1)   Why do you think Socrates feels responsible to defend justice? As Weiss claims, much of what he claims after his first go about simply expands off of Book I

  2)  Why do you think Adeimantus is so eager to pick up his brother’s argument? What does his argument do that Glaucon’s didn’t?

    3)  Weiss feels that Socrates treats Glaucon and Adeimantus differently than Thrasymachus because they have a similar opinion to him. Why do you think Plato would do this? How might the Greeks who first read this have responded to this – especially the “clever, not easily duped” youth who were actively living by Adeimantus’ argument?

     4)  In Thrasymachus’ argument justice is completely wretched, whereas “Glaucons describes Justice as ‘pleasing’ (359a) and as ‘honored’ (359b) as a mean between the best (doing injustice without suffering it) and the worst (suffering injustice without taking revenge)” (359a-b) (100). What do you make of this? Think about the role of moderation/mean in ancient Greece.

  5)  Are you convinced by Weiss’ conclusion of Socrates’ argument, that justice is largely based on the benefits the good rulers bestow on the ruled? Would you want to be the ruler? If you had the ability (ie; were a philosopher full of wisdom), would you feel compelled to rule?

"Rewriting the Poets in Plato" by David K. O'Connor

“Rewriting the Poets in Plato” by David K. O’Connor

           

             In the creation of the just city and determining the education of the guardians who protect and rule the city, Socrates states that poetry will not be allowed in the education system of the guardians. Yet the irony lies in the fact that Socrates himself refers back to famous poets such as Hesiod and Homer in order to retort the arguments made by Glaucon and Adeimantus (56). Plato uses these two poets in characterizing each of his brothers, adding a level of myth to the dialogue on justice (56).

            The references to the myth of Homer can be seen in the first few lines of the Republic, in which Socrates “descended” to Piraeus and Cephalus stating that Socrates does not “descend” to Piraeus very often (59). The word descend itself has mythological overtones as the Greek word means a trip to the underworld. O’Connor compares Socrates to the hero Odysseus who ended up retiring from his “labors” to live a quiet life away from politics after having descended into the underworld and gaining a new understanding (60). However, when Socrates refers to the passage in the Odyssey when Odysseus is told to seek out Teiresias, the blind prophet, we are left to question if Socrates is in fact the “hero” of the Republic or if he serves as the blind prophet who guides the hero out of the underworld (62). This idea of being guided towards the world of the living is revisited by Plato in the Allegory of the Cave where the only way for the prisoners to leave is if they are forcefully dragged up by someone (62). In the case of the Republic, it appears as though Socrates is the one guiding Glaucon in the ways of the world (62).

            O’Connor attributes the citing of Homer in the Republic to echo Glaucon, who is particularly interested in the political aspect of justice. Glaucon himself is portrayed as having manliness and courage as well as a lover of music and honor and erotic passion. The central question of the Republic is arguably how philosophy can channel the energy derived from this love of honor so that it can be used to serve the common good but not so that the desire to dominate overpowers the noble act (64). The guardian is said to be one who is not too soft and not too harsh and Socrates claims that Glaucon, though it seems he is political ambitious, is a mixture of both this softness (music) and harshness (gymnastics). But the fascination of tyranny as well as his struggle of erotic passion is most evident in his retelling of the Ring of Gyges in which he suggests that the first thing a man will do when given the opportunity to act free of consequences is to commit adultery. Because Glaucon is young, he does not have the wisdom to escape the fascination of tyranny as old men do and as a result, he needs a guide to show him. It is towards the end of the Republic that Socrates answers Glaucon’s Ring Of Gyges myth using passages from Homer that depict the afterlife. He brings up Hades’ cap which possesses the same power as the Ring of Gyges (68)

            The ambiguity of Socrates’ role as either the hero or the hero’s guide surround the question of whether “he knows how to get out of the cave or if he is simply showing the path for someone else” (63). According to O’Connor, the closest we ever get to answering this question is during the discussion of the “Good” during which everyone expects Socrates to explain what it is (63). However, Plato leaves us with a cliffhanger as Socrates says he cannot explain it, either because he does not truly know what it is or because those he is speaking to do not possess the capacity to understand it (63). O’Connor dives into the question of “What kind of guide Socrates has become for Glaucon?” (64). He identifies two moods that Socrates takes up throughout the dialogue, one that entails reformist ideals while the other an escapist’s. Socrates states that a guardian will want to flee from the city but must be compelled back into the world of politics.

            O’Connor points out that there is a religious/spiritual theme that can be found in the Republic, starting with the first few lines of the dialogue in which Socrates descends to Piraeus with Glaucon wanting to pray to the goddess (73). He draws the connection between the notions of using sacrifices as a way to atone for sins and the “releasing of the prisoners from their chains” in the Allegory of the Cave, both of which are ideas that Adeimantus rejects (75). While Glaucon is more concerned with the political aspect of justice, it seems as though Adeimantus is concerned with the spiritual aspect of justice. O’Connor says that Adeimantus wants simplicity, particularly in attaining virtue. Hesiod portrays the road of virtue to be a rough and steep one, something that Adeimantus wants to be easier (76). Just as Plato used Homer to answer Glaucon, he uses Hesiod in order to answer Adeimantus (78). Plato uses Hesiod’s “The Races of Metals” when talking about the noble lie and degeneration and especially the characterize the guardians. O’Connor ties in the retelling of Hesiod’s myth by Socrates, where the golden men haunt us even when they are still alive, into this idea of divine disguise as being a form of lying, something that Adeimantus is concerned with (81). Socrates once again looks to Homer in order to answer these questions. He suggests that Odysseus is a “disguised” god watching the suitors that have taken over his home, saying that a man is allowed to hide himself from his enemies if his life is in danger (83). The lies that exist in the Republic can be attributed to Plato’s rewriting of Hesiod’s “The Races of Metals” such as the noble lie that citizens must believe so that children are used as public resources for the city (83).

            Finally O’Connor ties in Hesiod’s myth when talking about the political degeneration in which he identifies the fourth of Plato’s five regimes as democracy. While it may be a bad regime, democracy is a city that can found when one adopts the reformist mood described earlier. Democracy allows for reform but also an escape because it is a regime that doesn’t necessarily have a “ruler” (87). O’Connor finishes his piece by praising Plato’s mythical take on democracy using the subtle voices of the poets Homer and Hesiod (87).

1. Do you think that Socrates’ role is more like Odysseus’s or more like Teiresias’s? Could his role be a combination of both or neither?
2. Does Plato’s incorporation of poetic passages contradict the initial decree of banning poetry from the education of the guardians?
3.   Why do you think that it is Glaucon that receives the speech about lying from Socrates even though it is Adeimantus who is concerned with human lying and divine disguise (83)?
4. Why do you think that Plato leaves this ambiguity regarding Socrates’s understanding of the “Good”?
5. O’Connor seems to think that Socrates had failed in guiding Glaucon by instilling in him two conflicting ideas, one where he cannot dismiss politics but also not be able to change it either (71). Do you think that Socrates failed? Where does this leave Glaucon in terms of either leaving the cave (politics) or returning to it?

Jordan Morris

Summary and Questions on "The Place of the Republic in Plato's Political Thought" by Christopher Rowe

 Throughout Book two of the Republic, Plato describes the arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus concerning justice. After delving into the two separate theories, Plato uses Socrates to explain justice in terms of the city and to develop his argument of who is best to rule in a city. While the Socrates of Book two emerges as a powerful philosophical figure, one who is a champion of wisdom, it becomes obvious that there is a distinct difference between book 1 and book 2 of Plato’s Republic. What is this cause of this change?

Christopher Rowe offers a key theory in understanding the difference between Book 1 and Book 2 of the Republic, as well as the difference between the Republic and all other Platonic dialogues. Rowe does so by first dividing his efforts into two sections. He first pays attention to other Platonic dialogues while evaluating the role of the statesman and city in politics. He continues to show the stark differences in each dialogue, as well as the role of the Socratic character and his feelings toward the politics throughout Plato’s works. He then turns his attention to the Republic, he and evaluates the influences the Republic and Socrates has had on each and every one of Plato’s works.

At the very beginning of his article, Rowe claims his mission is two fold in proving that, “Socratic conception of philosophy are fundamental to Plato’s political thinking,” and, “the precise relationship between Socrates, the main speaker throughout the Republic, and the philosopher-rulers of the second city he is made by the author to construct” (27). Overall, Rowe’s evaluation proves in fact that Platonic political philosophy has deep centered roots within the Republic that can be traced in all the other Platonic dialogues.

Rowe begins his analysis on Platonic political thought by constructing his first section on the differences between Plato’s other dialogues and the Republic. He points out that perspective is the main difference in each of the other dialogues (29). Rowe claims that the Socratic character is repeatedly emphasized as the only man worthy of ruling over citizens saying, “Socrates is the only one who has, or is as close as anyone comes to having, the kind of expertise that is needed for ruling…he alone has the true interests of his fellow-citizens at heart, and goes about helping them to secure those interests” (29). Socrates is deemed as the true statesman because he is the philosopher.

Rowe points out that these dialogues are meant to examine and explain the political/ruling authorities saying, “all of these dialogues are strongly critical of existing politicians, and have nothing positive to say about their ‘achievements’” (31). Rowe conveys that Plato wanted to offer a model for the type of justice and ruler that was needed, and he concerns himself with explaining the nature of the ideal statesman, which should be knowledgeable, wise, and one that is applicable to the general situations and not specific to each individual. Rowe states that the statesman “cannot be everywhere at once, prescribing individually for everyone…he must do it by setting down general prescriptions” (32).

With this idea of statesmanship in hand, Rowe continues to explain that it is law that helps fulfill the political and statesmanship role in society. Rowe states that the law keeps people acting just and wise even though they are not just and wise themselves (33-34). Rowe continues to show that the subject of the political is extremely important, and that the dialogues represent various aspects of the nature of the political that is deemed necessary. Rowe focuses on the “Socratic dialect” as well as the emphasis of good, which is present in the dialogues in order to serve as a base foundation for the argument of the Republic. To Rowe, the Republic is the union of the pieces present in the dialogues. Rowe finishes his first section of his article by pointing out the differences between the Republic and dialogues will lie within the conclusions instead of the processes (39).

 Rowe begins his second section by evaluating the Republic and its role in Plato’s political discourses. Rowe remarks on the change of the Socratic character and how there is a substantial difference in the dialogues and the Republic. Rowe believes that before the dialogue, the Socratic idea of human good is, “radical and provocative…and all desire is for the good—not for what merely appears or is thought good, but for the real good” (40). He advocates wisdom as the dominant force that will ultimately leads to happiness. Rowe then explains that with this theory, he is able to understand the character and method of Socrates in Plato’s works (40).

There are two particular aspects that he notes that add to the complexity of the Socratic character, one being his focus on “different aspects of the same set of ideas in different dialogues,” and, “that he typically starts from other points of view, other people’s assumptions” (40). Therefore, Rowe points out that these aspects add to confusion as to the conventional method of reasoning of Socrates, or how Socrates illustrates his points in his arguments. Next, Rowe pays attention to the natural difference between book 1 from the rest of the Republic. Rowe states that, “book 2 makes a new start, with Glaucon and Adeimantus restating the case for injustice, and Socrates embarking on a new and apparently more successful search for the nature of justice” (41). While Rowe notes the difference, he believes that Book 1 is still very necessary in understanding Plato’s political thought, and that it resembles the other Platonic dialogues that have been mentioned previously. Rowe believes that there is a newness in present in the Republic after Book 1 saying, “Books 2-10 announce the arrival of a new Plato, writing and thinking in a new way. Book 1, from this perspective, represents a kind of farewell appearance for the od Socrates before he gives way t the new, ambitious constructions that are the mark of the mature (or middle) Plato” (42).

 With this change in mind, Rowe delves deeper into the differences in the Republic, pointing out that the main argument begins from, “the need to convince others of something of which Socrates is himself already convinced and that he himself thinks he has already said enough to show” (43). He then takes us through the illustration of the city in order to find justice and goodness and how philosophers, especially Socrates, are the fitting rulers in a city. After the illustration of the good city, Rowe remarks on another difference between book 1 and the rest of the book. Rowe states that Socrates identifies virtues in book 1, “with wisdom, whereas in Republic 4 wisdom is said to be one thing, and justice, courage, and self-control are said to be other things” (47). This split of virtues, according to Rowe, is a way of elaborating his idea of justice, and finding true personal goodness, while still trying to maintain goodness in those separate virtues Rowe continues to explain the new idea of justice present in the Republic. He speculates that there is a certain system in Plato’s writings that asserted his characters to follow a certain method of reasoning, and therefore, end up with a specific conclusion. Rowe state that now, there is a, “connections between the Platonic idea of justice in the soul and the ‘vulgar’ idea of it” (49).

He continues t examine the differences saying that in book one, “the soul and in everything, it is goodness rather than its badness that enables it to perform its functions well; the function of the soul is ‘taking care and ruling and deliberating and all such things…the goodness of the soul is justice; so the just soul will live well” (51) He explains that this argument is changed by book 4 by explaining, “why the person with a just soul will live better: namely, because the just soul is one in which the reasoning part rules, and the non reasoning parts are rules” (51). With this now explained, Rowe points out that the argument is fulfilled to Glaucon, and he was the one that posed the question back in book 1. Rowe concludes his article by explaining that the ultimate goal in every Platonic dialogue is, “to make people as good as possible” (53), and it is with the argument of justice in the republic that, “will allow him, the position of the Socrates of the pre-Republic dialogues” (53). Therefore, Rowe believes that this argument is key in understanding and the basis for all political thought concerning Plato.

Overall, Rowe believes that Plato makes a substantive change in his writing with the Republic, yet, “retains the basic Socratic view that, as rational beings, it is the real good that we desire, and the real good that it is in all our interests to discover; or else-so Plato adds—to enact, to the highest degree of which we are capable, even if that is divorced from understanding” (53-54).

 1) What does it mean when Rowe refers to the Socratic conception of Philosophy? Is that in line with Plato’s idea of philosophy?

 2) Why is it necessary to understand the other Platonic works? Can the Republic stand on its own feet, or do readers need other support in order to understand Plato’s idea of justice?

3) Why is law viewed so negatively in Platonic dialogues?

4) Is it really necessary for wisdom to be split into different virtues as pointed out on page 47?

 5) Does Rowe make a convincing argument for the need of pre-Republic Dialogues to understand the arguments present in books 1-4 of the Republic?

Summary and Questions for “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic” by Harvey Yunis

In Harvey Yunis’ article “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” Yunis examines what purpose motivated Plato to write the Republic, how we can know that purpose, and how the Republic is shaped in order to accomplish such a goal. More specifically, he is interested in how Plato intended for the Republic to effect its readers, both contemporary and far onward to ourselves millennia later. Yunis argues “that Plato’s purpose as a philosophical writer was not merely to present compelling arguments about how one should live, but to present them in such a way that the reader would be most likely to be compelled by them to live in a particular way” (1). As such, it seems that Yunis identifies Plato’s ultimate goal as to incite change and action, not merely contemplation, and he interprets the Republic as a persuasive text that endorses the arguments within.  

Yunis clarifies the kind of active change the Republic aims at by pointing to the change exemplified by the interlocutors Glaucon and Adeimantus over the course of Socrates’ argument. He claims that Glaucon and Adeimantus change in three ways: they change their views on justice, they change their values, and they are depicted in such a way by Plato as to suggest that they will change the way they live after the close of the dialogue. These last two are particularly important as the two brothers are turned toward valuing virtue and the good over anything selfish or material. This is the purpose of the arguments of the Republic, and “this purpose can be summed up in the word protreptic” (4). A protreptic education, as defined by Yunis, “does not by itself bring about education in virtue;” rather, “it aims to get education in virtue under way, to get the reader or auditor turned and moving in the right direction, and to make the acquisition of virtue an urgent priority” (4). In Yunis’ argument, this definition of protreptic education is all important, for Yunis argues that a protreptic education of readers is Plato’s fundamental goal with the Republic. From this point, Yunis divides his essay into four parts. The first looks to what it meant for Plato to write in order to change his readers values, the second to who the audience of the Republic was, the third to how “the view of the Republic as protreptic [squares] with Plato’s views on political and philosophical discourse,” and fourth to how this protreptic goal is reflected in the text (5).

In regards to the first, Yunis argues that Plato was not operating on the premise that “he could change the values of every reader who picked up the Republic,” or that any potential readers would be as enthusiastic as Glaucon and Adeimantus. Rather, as demonstrated by an interlocutor like Thrasymachus, some readers would have no desire to for an earnest philosophical discussion towards examining a virtuous life. However, while Plato could not determine how readers would be affected by the text, his “strategy was to exploit the available literary sources,” which were under Plato’s control, “in such a way that an unknown reader would most likely be moved as close to Socrates’ position on justice and the soul as possible” (7). This protreptic strategy is less focused on the outcome and more on making the educational material as compelling to a reader as possible. In this way, Yunis parallels Plato’s protreptic endeavor, through writing, with Socrates’ protreptic endeavor, through conversation with his fellow citizens. Also, like Socrates, Plato’s endeavor should be judged by its goals and methods, not its overall outcome. Indeed, “if Plato were to move that reader even slightly closer to Socrates’ view of justice and the soul than he was before, that would not be an insignificant achievement” (9).

In the second section, Yunis describes the social and historical background in which Plato was writing and how the genre of dialogue fit into such a climate. The dialogue form was a kind of popular writing that avoided “the constraints of democratic competition and the religious scruples attached to public poetic performance,” which gave the dialogue form an unprecedented freedom (10). It is likely that only the aristocratic class would have had the leisure and education to read Plato’s dialogues; however, there is no real evidence of who the contemporary Athenian readers were or what kind of background they brought to the text. More importantly, Yunis identifies the “moral and political status” of Plato’s intended readers (11). These individuals would be “responsible for their personal welfare and common affairs, who had choices to make, individually and collectively” (11). Yunis further argues that Plato wrote for a broad audience because Plato broke with the philosophical tradition of writing technical treatises, and, instead, he “sought to treat ethical problems of universal relevance and to make philosophy accessible”  by writing engaging literary dialogues (13). The effect of this new style is important because it is aimed at appealing to the reader by making philosophy seem almost ordinary and the “consequence of a chance, everyday encounter,” much like the one we see opening the Republic. Such naturalness results in what Yunis terms “disguised protreptic,” which disarms the reader and opens minds to Plato’s protreptic purpose (14).

The third section argues that the protreptic nature works in conjunction with Plato’s political and philosophical aims. In the Republic, Plato warns of the danger faced by a philosopher in the city, and, accordingly, writing dialogues allows Plato to make philosophical arguments while retaining freedom of speech and personal safety. Moreover, his dialogues are an experimental attempt “to explain what philosophy is and why political power should be entirely vested in the philosophers” (17). Yunis even suggests that Plato implements in his writing the strategies he delineates in the Republic for how the guardians should be educated. In the dialogue, Plato wants to control influences such as “mythological tales, narrative and dramatic poetry, particular rhythms, songs, diction…,” many of which are used by Plato himself in the Republic to comprehensively make his arguments. More importantly, this makes the Republic a “counter charm to poetry’s spell,” as Socrates’ argues for in the text. In this sense, “the Republic challenges and aims to supplant Homer,” “to rectify deeply ingrained cultural values,” and “to bring about the symbolic displacement of the massive body of poetry at the center of the inherited culture” (19).

In the last section, Yunis turns to identifying examples of Plato’s protreptic purpose in the text. The greatest protreptic moment in in Book 5 when Socrates speaks of the “three waves.” The waves are the proposals about women and children and culminate in the argument for philosopher kings. Such proposals “are incompatible with conventional beliefs about human nature current in fourth century Greece, and it is that incompatibility that creates the threat posed by the three waves” (21). Indeed, the proposals seem impossible. As such, Plato must encourage his readers to overcome their culturally inherited conventions and accept the argument on its merits. This is accomplished rhetorically through Plato’s narrative and imagistic devices. For instance, “the image of the cave contributes greatly to this task: it depicts conventional values as unnatural, and it explains the fact that the unnaturalness of these values has generally gone unnoticed” (22). Additionally, the characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus, individuals much like Plato’s prospective audience, are crucial because they embody the transformation from disbelief to true belief. As such, they allow “the reader to feel… that perhaps he too can withstand the waves and come to accept philosopher kings as natural” (23). What is all important is that the text and its literary devices are as compelling as possible to the reader to turn them, as Glaucon and Adeimantus are turned, towards value virtue and living virtuous lives.

Questions:

1. Why does Yunis think it necessary to distinguish between education that itself brings about virtue and protreptic education that only aims to turn the audience toward virtue? Why does the Republic fall into the protreptic category and not the former?

2. If the Republic is protreptic as defined by Yunis, are Socrates’ arguments are to be understood as Plato’s legitimate political ideas and goals? Can we take Plato at face value?

3. For Yunis, the Republic is primarily educational. However, it could also be interpreted as primarily political. Can either be said to be more or less correct? Or is it even valuable to attempt to nail down one single motivating force behind the writing of the Republic?

4. Yunis singles out Glaucon and Adeimantus as the examples within the text of the transformation Plato desires in his readers. What about the other interlocutors? Thrasymachus could be a negative example, but what about Polemarchus or Cephalus? How are they meant to affect us, the readers?

5. Yunis suggests that the Republic may be a counter charm to the allure of poetry. In Books I and II, the interlocutors often cite poets as authority figures. Is there a specific way Socrates’ responded to these uses of the poets that suggests how he is countering them?