Sunday, April 3, 2011

Parmenides

Parmenides is one of the hardest Plato texts that I have read up to this date. In the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates challenges Zeno/Parmenides view on "the one"; Zeno/Parmenides believes that it is absurd for anyone to believe in the view of plurality of beings. That is, it is impossible for things to be both like and unlike (along with many other terms that are contrary by nature). While discussing what "the one" would be, Parmenides goes through many contradictory statements to discuss what "the one" isn't; by doing this, he is providing a reductio ad absurdum argument for what the "one" is by discussing what it couldn't possibly be. The Reductio ad absurdum argument is used in Aristotle's Metaphysics book to account for logical forms that don't appear valid at first glance.

Yet, the reductio ad absurdum does not necessarily provide new information about the concept at hand; instead, this line of argument to me is only able to express what the item isn't.
It seems that this tool of reductio ad absurdum works well when it isn't fully examined by a keen philosophical mind; that is, as a tool for persuasion, it works very well. It compares two concepts, one particular concept in a negative light and the other idea in a more positive light; it attempts to prove that the idea in the positive is the only logical conclusion left after the validity of the other concept has been proven false.

I look back on Parmenides' argument of oneness and it seems that his line of reasoning still leaves other possibilities; I do not feel satisfied with the results that arise out of the argument simply because they conclude out necessity with few alternatives that might still be possible.

I believe that we (collectively as a society), still use this type of reasoning (even though it can be fallacious) to a certain degree. We still forget to look for more alternatives to the conclusion we quickly arise to; that is, in any given situation, I believe that although there is only one possible conclusion that is valid, it is still possible for a conclusion to arise out of premises that is invalid; not because of a flaw in the argument, but by not introducing enough facts to arise to the correct conclusion. In the case of describing how things relate to one another, I believe that we are simply unable to capture even one quality or concept of all the possible things in this world (universe, space outside that universe, etc. to infinite).

Still, I must commend Plato's attempt to reconcile all the things of this earth in his theories of forms so that philosophers might know all instances of a form by knowing the form itself.
In Phaedo Socrates commits suicide; he infers various reasons why philosophers should not fear death but welcome it as well. Is suicide than a reasonable act? Some might surmise that he did not have a choice in the matter since he was sentenced to death, and it was also decided that he should die this way. My question is than as follow is Socrates willingness to die any less a suicide?

I might agree with the idea that Socrates acceptance of his condemnation is a testament to his beliefs that justice should be according to those elected to give it. Those who condemned him however did fit Socrates description of wise. They were not philosopher kings or philosophers at all because if they were I am assuming Socrates would never have been put on trial. Where than is the logic behind Socrates’ suicide? Doesn’t that very act undermine his thoughts on our nature?

I remain adamant that Socrates had a choice; he could have refused to commit suicide. In his refusal he would have defended all his views amongst which are the one that suicide no matter the circumstance is wrong. Isn’t fighting for one’s belief more important than yielding to the wishes of others especially when it compromises who we are? Socrates wish to die and his elation towards the end is no different to me than those committing suicide to escape the pain of being alive. Unless of course Socrates meant that suicide is acceptable base on circumstances.

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Parmenides: The One

I would like to continue this discussion about the forms and this description of “the one” in Parmenides. First, I would like to conclude that the forms and “the one” are the same thing because the context seems to imply that this is the case even though it is not explicit despite the passage that seems to separate the two things. However, in making this conclusion, as brought up in class, how do we explain that more than one thing can embody the same form if it (the form) is one and cannot be divided? Could we offer the conclusion that more than one thing is a reflection of a form but does not acquire an actual piece of that form? Or should we go with Socrates' theory of the sunlight? Or should we conclude the theory of the sail that was proposed in the text? I would like to propose my personal theory that I just mentioned regarding a reflection. Perhaps each form is like a mirror. A mirror is able to reflect multiple different things at one time without being divided. Also, in terms of being in parts or being a whole, the mirror analogy also fits well. I would like to argue that forms do not have parts. Forms, like a mirror, do not require to be in parts to reflect, or to embody multiple things.


Now, in terms of "the one" being in neither in rest or in motion as discussed in Parmenides, how does that come to be is the big question. One automatically assumes that if something is not in rest, then it is in motion, and if it is not in motion, then it is in rest. It seems that it is only two options here and no between. However, maybe one could suggest that it is in this state of becoming in which it was in this state of rest and is becoming in motion, or it was in motion and is becoming at rest. In other words, it is in neither rest or motion because it is in its becoming stage. However, there is never any indication by the text that it will ever reach a state of rest or motion, so if we go with my theory, then the one will always remain in the becoming stages of being in motion or in rest.

What can Parmenides tell us about Being?

What can Parminedes tell us about being? He offers a description and gives a few arguments. He argues that being is eternal and being cannot come into being and also that it cannot go out of being. Being cannot come into being because the problem would then become where did it come from. So if being were to come into being then it would have to come from something that is not being. And also, what is non being? Parminedes says that non being cannot be a concept. Another thing is that being cannot go out of being because then where would it go? I think that this is where Parmenides gets his concept of eternal from.

Parmenides also claims that being is indivisible, that it cannot be divided into parts. Being is one, according to Parmenides. If being were to have parts then we would have to say that this one thing is a part of being and this other thing is a part of being, etc. I mean, with the example from my hand on my body. I know that my hand is different than my foot, right? My hand is not my foot. But with being this concept is difficult because we cannot say something like “not being” because Parmenides rules out the concept of not being. From this Parminedes concludes that being is one.

From this I am assuming that Parmenides is referring to reality being one. I think Parmenides is a genius.

Monday, March 21, 2011

Theory about Plato

I was thinking that maybe the reason why Plato never answers any of his questions in a more direct manner is because he does not want to influence our answers. While he tries to teach us the right way to think about a topic and guide us towards certain topics worth exploring, he does not impose us his ideologies. Reading his works separately I will admit is not an easy task; relating them under one umbrella however, for me particularly, make all his ideas more sensible.

While Plato seems to specifically dissect the human soul in the republic; I have come to believe that most of his works have one specific goal to analyze the different parts of human nature, and to help individually define who we are. The books that we’ve covered thus far examined virtue, perception, justice etc; they all have a common thread and its man’s true nature.

Is it possible that Plato knew the answers to the questions he sought? Is it possible that he did not answer them to give our own conclusion a sense of individuality? I know of course that it is probably a possibility I’d be grateful to know why exactly it would be a plausible theory?

Friday, March 18, 2011

Plato: Godfather of Soul

I believe that at this point, I could portray fairly accurately the model of the soul for Socrates. Firstly, the soul is immortal, unable to be broken, and exists in an immaterial sense. It is the master of the body (not vice-versa), yet can still be influenced by bodily pleasures. It leaves the body upon death (in a sense, it causes the death of the body and causes the life of a new body) and goes into the realm of forms where it commutes with all forms and gains all possible knowledge. Aside from all of this, I am interested as to where the soul originated.

In the Timeaus, there are two accounts given of the creation of earth: the first account is that of the Intellectual and the second account being that of Necessity.  I am particularly curious about the second account's claim that there are three things that existed even before the universe existed (out of necessity): being, becoming, and space. I am curious as to how the soul would exist in one of these three conditions if it were to exist before the universe came to be* (for lack of a better word). If the soul were to exist as being, then it would be unable to change; that is, it wouldn't change from one body to the next, or change from the material realm to the form realm. If the soul were to exist as becoming, it is necessary that it would always be changing and becoming. This condition would render the soul as being made and then destroyed constantly if this cycle were to come close to being in the infinite nature of the soul. But this wouldn't be the same soul in a sense, it would be a new soul created and destroyed each time. Yet, surely, the soul doesn't exist in space which is to be understand as simply the place for something to be or become.

If I am to salvage the image of the soul for me, I'm left to consider a few new possibilities: a) the soul might not be immortal, b) the soul has a part that is immortal and a part that isn't immortal (one part that is being and another part that is becomming), or c) the soul came after the universe was made. In the nature of Socrates, I wish to maintain that the soul is immortal; however, I wish to shine light on the fact that Socrates has proposed a model of the soul that contained different parts that were constituted an entire soul. Perhaps, in a sense, it is possible to present this model altered for our purposes. Perhaps the soul is that which is composed of both being and becoming at once; that is, perhaps it has a certain nature of actualization (to coin Aristotle) and a nature of potentiality. The soul would have two distinct parts that constitute a sense of worldly being that is constantly becoming something new so as to correspond to the world in flux and it would have a part that always is the same and doesn't change to the world. To think of this graphically, the part of being (not changing) would be like the center with the part of becoming (changing) on the outside.
Yet, even with this model, I'm afraid that more problems arise; is it possible to both be and to also become? If this is so, there would be no necessity for the soul to enter the body to be its master (if it has the power to actualize all at once with no body).

Final thought: the soul of the world must have come after the universe existed, or at the same time by both necessity and by wordily definition. If the soul of the world came after the universe existed, then it seems to follow by sub-alternation that the souls of people came afterward as well.

Sunday, March 13, 2011

Families

I want to talk about the subject in 18d of the Timaeus reading when they were talking about the procreation of children. This subject was odd for me because Timaeus and Socrates said that they agreed that everyone should have spouses and that things should be put into place that hinder people from recognizing his or her own child. Also, everything would be set up so that everyone would look at each other as family. To me, this sounds like some kind of communist way of thinking. I can’t imagine why they would agree that this system of raising families would possibly be sufficient. In my opinion, this would be the worst system because it would prevent everyone from knowing what a real family is. How could this system possibly work?

Thursday, March 3, 2011

Forms and Creativity

In Phaedo, Plato discusses his theory on forms. He argues that forms hold the true meaning of things in themselves. For instance, Plato speaks about beauty. He says,

[I]f someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons--for all these confuse me--...that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. ...[I]t is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful (Plato 100d-100e).


Plato is arguing that when we apply the term beautiful to an object, we explain this by verbalizing how it exemplifies beauty in describes the characteristic of that thing. However, only the form of beauty can exemplify what beauty is in itself absent from material objects. Also, in relation to the forms, Plato uses the example of height. Plato argues that we become tall after being short in terms of the theory of opposites; however, based on the theory of forms, tallness does not derive from shortness. Tallness is a form that already exists and is separate from shortness. Plato implies that new forms cannot be made instead they are merely discovered. In The Courage to Create, Plato’s theory fits in perfectly with Rollo May’s definition of the courage to create which is “the discovering of new forms” (May 21). So, perhaps, to be creative does not mean one is creating something purely and entirely new, but one is simply discovering something new that no one else has seen. A true artist is able to tap into the realm of the forms and come back bearing gifts of new discoveries. Plato argues that only the soul is able to experience the universe of forms, and to do so, the soul has to be separated from the body. If Plato’s theory is true, then it is as if artists are capable of out of body experiences, and these experiences provide us with art.



May, Rollo. The Courage to Create. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. Print.


Thursday, February 17, 2011

Phaedo and Cratylus

In Phaedo, Socrates claims that a true philosopher should not be afraid of death but should look forward to it. For, in death, the soul is separated from the body, and this separation from the body allows the soul to obtain true knowledge through reason. Socrates argues that the body is incapable of obtaining true knowledge because its senses are deceiving, and according to Socrates, “the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it” (Phaedo 65c). Socrates claims that the body is unable to understand things in themselves. The soul is only capable of achieving this. For example, the term “beautiful” in itself cannot be explored by the senses of the body. The body is capable of applying this term to objects saying, “this painting is beautiful because of the arrangement of colors,” but the body is not able to adequately explore the term “beautiful” absent of an object. However, the soul has the ability to examine the term “beautiful” in itself.


This theory that Plato introduces in Phaedo mirrors the theory of names that is presented Cratylus. Plato argues that in obtaining knowledge, or an understanding about something, one should not seek for this knowledge in the object’s name but in the object itself. Now, in the Cratylus, Socrates not does provide a means of achieving this. He claims that this process of gaining true knowledge of an object with the absence of the object’s name is “too large a topic” to be discussed. Well, I am proposing that this theory that is proposed in Phaedo is precisely the answer of how to obtain knowledge about an object absent of its name--you achieve this through the soul.

Da soul and da philosopher's profession

In the Phaedo dialogue, Plato brings up some serious speculation about souls and the afterlife. I say “serious speculation”, not because the subject matter is serious (although it is) but because the arguments and reasoning used by Plato is highly conjectural. For example, Socrates makes use of an old legend in order to state that the “living come into being again from the dead” (pg. 53, 70d). This eventually leads to his “opposites from opposites” argument, which I think everybody thought was ridiculous in class. This is important to note because I find it really interesting how Socrates says “true philosophers make dying their profession, and that to them of all men death is least alarming” (pg. 50, 67e). I’m wondering how the philosopher’s profession could primarily be about a topic that is so indefinite. Philosophy to me seems to be about knowledge, and the philosopher’s profession would be one that pertains to a bit more certainty and conclusiveness than Plato suggests here. However a thing that is entailed in the philosopher’s preparation for death is the nourishment of the soul through doing philosophy, and doing philosophy in of itself has a definite degree of certainty. The only uncertainty is in terming the philosopher’s profession as one of dying and/or preparing for death.

Also, I think Plato would regard the soul as being something more animate and alive, rather than ethereal and mysterious. An example of this would be when he is talking about how the philosopher “frees his soul from association with the body” (pg. 47, 65a). This implies that the soul is a living thing because only living things can be trapped and/or freed. A further example is just in the length of his discussion of the soul. He talks about it a lot, which probably shows that he does not regard it as something beyond his comprehension.