In Phaedo, Socrates claims that a true philosopher should not be afraid of death but should look forward to it. For, in death, the soul is separated from the body, and this separation from the body allows the soul to obtain true knowledge through reason. Socrates argues that the body is incapable of obtaining true knowledge because its senses are deceiving, and according to Socrates, “the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it” (Phaedo 65c). Socrates claims that the body is unable to understand things in themselves. The soul is only capable of achieving this. For example, the term “beautiful” in itself cannot be explored by the senses of the body. The body is capable of applying this term to objects saying, “this painting is beautiful because of the arrangement of colors,” but the body is not able to adequately explore the term “beautiful” absent of an object. However, the soul has the ability to examine the term “beautiful” in itself.
This theory that Plato introduces in Phaedo mirrors the theory of names that is presented Cratylus. Plato argues that in obtaining knowledge, or an understanding about something, one should not seek for this knowledge in the object’s name but in the object itself. Now, in the Cratylus, Socrates not does provide a means of achieving this. He claims that this process of gaining true knowledge of an object with the absence of the object’s name is “too large a topic” to be discussed. Well, I am proposing that this theory that is proposed in Phaedo is precisely the answer of how to obtain knowledge about an object absent of its name--you achieve this through the soul.
I think this is really great - and a wonderful connection of a theme cutting across multiple dialogues. I agree that what seems to come from the name/nature distinction is the inevitable conclusion that human beings are *with* things, such that things give their nature to the perceiver via the soul. This claim I am suggesting is somewhat related to the idea in Theatetus that the soul can attain truth via discerning Being and Nonbeing. The soul presumably wouldn't be able to do this if it didn't commune with things and natures (i.e. like Shari says, forms).
ReplyDeleteOh and by the way - for the historians of philosophy in our class - most of what I suggested in the comment above is reflective of the guiding assumptions of the school known as phenomenology, i.e. that we are with things; things are "given" via appearance or disclosure; and that truth occurs when we "presence" Being in its fullness.
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