Friday, January 28, 2011

Knowledge in Theaetetus

In Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, the concept of knowledge is discussed. One question that I am interested in is whether or not one can lose knowledge. I know this may seem like overstepping; I am wondering if one can lose knowledge before defining what it is and how one gets it. However, I think that there is something to be gained by discussing this quality of knowledge, as a means of getting to its definition.

Now, on one hand, it seems apparent that if one has knowledge, one cannot lose it. On the other hand, there seem to be occasions when this occurs. For example, say that one can know that Paris is the capitol of France, or any other similar fact. Then, years go by, and someone says, “hey, what is the capitol of France,” or “what is the air speed velocity of an unladen swallow?” Something one used to know, but when it is asked, one cannot remember the answer. Does one still “know” the answer, or did one truly forget it?

According to the Socratic theory of recollection, one knows all things and has just forgotten them; in which case one needs only be prompted to memory in order know again. However, there seems to be some misuse of terms: if one has forgotten, it would stand to reason that one does not know any more. Therefore, one cannot remember that which one has not forgotten, or lost. The quibble here is that knowledge must be ephemeral or fleeting, in order to be forgettable.

So, if one can forget knowledge, then it does not seem to be such a special thing, if it is temporary. I wonder if knowledge as a fleeting thing sheds any light on what “knowledge” is. Whether it is attained solely through the perception or not, it is forgettable. A further question would then be are there different levels of knowing; i.e. the closer or more distinct something is in the mind’s eye (or eye, if knowledge is perception), the more one “knows” it. Likewise, if one is closer to forgetting something, is it less known. This, to me, is an interesting question that bares further thought.

1 comment:

  1. St. Augustine addresses the issue of memory in the Confessions in a fashion somewhat similar to how you approach it here. It's definitely a problem.

    On a different note, the Greek sense of forgetting is related to the notion of truth understood as aletheia, uncovering. Forgetting in the Greek occurs when things become covered over, lethe. When one's memory fails to serve, the Greek sense isn't about the inability to remember, but rather indicates being absent or concealed from oneself. So in response to your questions, one might say that knowledge in Theatetus and Meno is about keeping things present and open to view, not letting them become covered over or concealed. It's the same dynamic that appears to play out in Book X of the Republic. Those who drink too much of the river Lethe (the river of forgetfulness) end up covering over the knowledge gained in previous lives.

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