Seminar Paper - Book 2

Jordin Post

6^th March, 2016

Dr. Thomas

Seminar Paper

Patience, Trust, and Argumentative Pixie Dust:

Considerations on Glaucon’s Original Argument

At the beginning of Book Two, Glaucon takes on Thrasymachus’s argument for injustice being better than justice and fleshes it out to the fullest and richest argument he can make, despite his promise that his argument is “not at all of [his] own opinion” (358c). Glaucon throws many things at Socrates, some of which Socrates addresses handily and quickly within book two. The point Socrates manages to ignore—or at least seemingly ignore—is one of the first Glaucon makes: The first definition of justice and injustice. Socrates only addresses part of what Glaucon’s his definition in book two, and does so indirectly; what scrap of bone Socrates does decide to throw Glaucon (surprisingly) satisfies our favorite interlocutor until book eight, during which Socrates gives him the answer he was looking for. Glaucon’s patience isn’t the only surprising thing; the conclusions Socrates and Glaucon come to together, thanks to their mutual patience and trust as interlocutors, reveal surprising things about Socrates’ opinion and character.

Glaucon’s opening argument is scathing, and it all stems from how he originally defines justice. “[Justice] is a mean between what is best—doing injustice without paying the penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself” (358e&359a). Despite Glaucon’s insistence that he will “restore Thrasymachus’ argument” (358c), what he presents to Socrates’ is a far better, and fundamentally different, argument than what Thrasymachus put forward. Glaucon defines justice in the context of injustice. Justice is not a virtue as described earlier and later in the Republic. Justice is simply following the laws preventing injustice from happening; it is an action of a person instead of a characteristic as put forward by Thrasymachus. Justice and injustice are dependent on one another. This definition allows Glaucon to build the statues we see in book two. If justice is following the rules, confirmed by the society, then it is possible to appear just without being so simply by not getting caught doing “unjust” actions.

The other, subtler part of Glaucon’s definition of justice has to do with what he calls “the genesis and being of justice” (359a). According to Glaucon, people need to “set down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it” (359b) in order to protect themselves. The idea resembles a form of social contract theory. People are giving up their rights to perform injustices in order to form a group of people—I am willing to go so far as to say a city—in order to protect themselves from injustices being enacted on the people in the group.

Socrates grants Glaucon the context he presents in his first definition, though he then only addresses a bit from each part of the real definition. Socrates’ decision to make a city as a macroscopic view on justice stems not only from Thrasymachus’ use of cities in book one, but also from the context of Glaucon’s definition. To Socrates, Glaucon has the right idea to pin justice and injustice to the gathering of people. Socrates rejects Glaucon’s idea that justice is dependent on injustice, as Socrates asks Adeimantus “where in [the complete healthy city], then, would justice and injustice be? Along with which of the things we considered did they come into being” (371e). This is the first mention of justice and injustice since Socrates proposes the city/soul analogy, and he isn’t taking into account here that Glaucon’s definition would necessitate only finding the injustice in the city. Socrates thinks that the separation of the two as an assumption in his own argument, and in this way, indirectly says that he thinks Glaucon’s definition is wrong. Regarding Glaucon’s subtler point, Socrates’ response is, ironically, more direct. He offers a social contract of his own in his creation of the city analogy, stating “well then… a city, as I believe, comes into being because each of us isn’t self-sufficient but is in need of much” (369b).

Now, here is where it gets interesting. Both Glaucon and Socrates have presented what resembles different forms of the social contract—different reasons as to why people gather. For Glaucon, people are avoiding possible harm, even if it means they have to give up their ability to enact injustice upon others. For Socrates, people are coming together cooperatively, in order to build up a society that benefits them all. To Weiss, the two are simply stating the same idea—that justice is the weak society’s tool against the stronger (Weiss 100 & 107-108)—in different ways. What seems to be the case instead, if we frame their definitions in terms of the social contract, is that they are providing different interpretations on the state of nature (the baseline of how people act). In Glaucon’s definition, people are naturally unjust, and, based on Glaucon’s retelling of the Ring of Gyges tale, fairly violent. Everyone is unjust, unless they are restrained for convenience. Socrates, on the other hand, has offered the assumption that everyone is for the most part naturally kind and cooperative.

When Socrates asks whether or not his idea of the genesis of the city is true, Glaucon doesn’t object, even though the wording and intention seem to be different than what he proposed earlier. Glaucon is hardly shy in the argument, even at this early stage in the Republic. His easy agreement on this point must mean that either he believes that what Socrates says is true, or he just trusts that Socrates will take it on later when it is relevant. Regarding the first idea, Glaucon might actually believe in the story he proposes. By “restoring” Thrasymachus’ argument as something completely different, he’s likely “promot[ing] his own brand of cynicism” (Weiss 100). Socrates needs to actually change Glaucon’s belief, so Glaucon is likely unwilling to let go just to benefit Socrates’ side.

What Glaucon does seem to be willing to do is let the matter slide so Socrates can tackle it later in the Republic. This willingness can be attributed to Glaucon’s disposition, surely, but it is also possible to take this as Glaucon returning Socrates a favor for the argument. Glaucon created his statues, and despite Socrates’ reluctance to take on the argument the way Glaucon wanted him to, he says he is willing to argue that justice is in itself valuable to the soul. Similarly, Glaucon, understanding that their points on human nature are unresolvable without first fully proving one side, grants Socrates the ability to lay down the assumption that people are reasonably cooperative and willingly pliable to laws, with hopes that Socrates will repay him down the line.

Glaucon’s faith is not misplaced. While Socrates truly doesn’t address Glaucon’s concern in book two, he takes books eight through ten to answer Glaucon’s question with the weight and length such a claim on human nature deserves. He also treats Glaucon in this section as an equal in argument instead of simply an interlocutor. In book ten Socrates asks Glaucon to dismantle his statues and return the appearance of justice to its being (612cde)—this much is plain—but by this point he had already returned to the argument Glaucon’s fundamental belief. In book eight, Socrates and Glaucon detail the devolvement of the just city. Before the Republic launches into the gritty details of the worst cities, Socrates monologues the demise of the monarchy/aristocracy, during which Socrates’ tone to Glaucon seems to turn sour. Socrates’ words seem to point to Glaucon as the reason for the just city’s demise: “the men you educated will nonetheless fail,” “barrenness of your kind” (8.546b), “your guardians,” “from there your young will become more unmusical. And rulers chosen from them won’t be guardians very apt at testing Heisod’s races and yours” (8.546de). What is actually happening is that Socrates is acknowledging what Glaucon assumed in his definition all the way back in book two. People tend to the unjust, and this tendency is what sets the stage for the inglorious fall of the Socratic Empire. Thus, the shift to the second person isn’t doesn’t so much show Socrates’ anger with Glaucon (though it’s still a possibility), but rather showcases the fact that it’s Glaucon’s point that allows the group to honestly analyze what the unjust looks like in reality. And we can confirm that this exchange in book eight is not simply political commentary. Before Socrates launches into the discussion, he tells Glaucon that “if there are five arrangements of cities, there would also be five for the soul of private men” (344e). Glaucon agrees, of course, so that together they can finish their city-soul analogy thoroughly.

               

For Socrates to acknowledge Glaucon’s opinion as correct does is not necessarily contrary to what he had been putting forward since book two of the Republic. By book ten he dismantled the necessity of the Ring of Gyges story (612b), and put forth justice as an attainable state for the soul, so long as effort is actually maintained towards that end. To say that people desire to justice does not contradict their tendency to fall off that track. Socrates says that something will go wrong “some time” even in the most just of cities/souls (546b); it only requires one unjust action from a generally just person to ruin perfection. Together Glaucon and Socrates have shaved off the extremes of the other’s assumptions, and come to a realistic conclusion that the soul benefits from its attempt to be perfectly just, both for justice itself and the external benefits appearing to be just provides.

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