Book
V of the Republic signals a change in the conversation when Polymarchus draws
in the cloak of Adeimantus and forces Socrates to re-examine his argument. It
is a clear parallel to Book I where it is Polymarchus arresting Socrates by
ordering his slave to physically grab Socrates’ cloak. Or is there more to it?
This in a nut-shell is how I feel about Book V. Where on the surface, it seems this
is where the similarities between the cloak references in I and V ends, I
believe Plato takes it a step further. In light of the search for these deeper
connection in book V, I argue that Socrates ignored the argument of women and
children because of the first two waves, not because of the third. But let us
return to our example before addressing my main concern. In Book I, after
arresting Socrates and Glaucon, Polymarchus asserts his strength in numbers,
asking them, “’Could you really persuade,’ he said, ‘if we don’t listen?’”
(327c). The answer obviously is no; they couldn’t persuade them. In Book V,
after arresting Socrates, it is clear that they are listening. I believe Plato
is saying, ok you didn’t have to listen but now you are, and now that you are
listening let’s take it back to the cloak conversation, “Then the women
guardians must strip, since they’ll clothe themselves in virtue instead of
robes,” and then ridicules the man who laughs at this (457a-b). The cloak
conversation is not merely a new beginning, it is a challenge to the
interlocutors based on what they’ve retained so far, asking them if they’ll
scoff at a women guardian or if they’ll let her do what she by nature was born to
do.
Before
addressing the first wave, it is necessary to see Socrates’ hesitation. He
first argues that he doesn’t know the truth or the dangers accompanying this,
but that there are obvious dangers, and even if the interlocutors weren’t to
hold him guilty, he would be like an “involuntary murder[er]” (451a-b). But an
involuntary murderer is still a murderer and is not held guiltless by the gods,
unless absolved by the victim or a family member of the victim – which Socrates
is. But it’s still a fine line and not the most encouraging start to his
argument. I believe this hesitation in essence is the reason he is reluctant
before the second wave too: it complicates the parts of the soul.
On
the surface, the first wave is about the education of the women in the City in
Speech. It is not surprising that Socrates comes to the conclusion that they
should be educated for what they’re going to be, as we’ve seen before that the
guardians are educated to be guardians, a shoe maker is educated to become a
shoemaker etc. It starts to get interesting after he’s made the argument that
men and women are not different by nature and therefore must be educated
together, “One education won’t produce men for us and another women, will it,
especially since it is dealing with the same nature?” (456c-d) No, they are the
same by nature so they must be educated together. We can assert from this that
since a man can be a guardian, auxiliary or worker, so can a woman, “Therefore,
my friend, there is no practice of a city’s governors which belongs to woman
because she’s woman, or to man because he’s man; but the natures are scattered
alike among both animals; and woman participates according to nature in all
practices, and man in all, but in all of them woman is weaker than man”
(455d-e).
The conversation
of weakness on the surface feels odd and sexist, but it proves to be richer
than this. Although being weak has a negative connotation and implies
subordination, I don’t think that’s Socrates’ point. The point is that although
women in Athenian society had less rights than men and were undoubtable weaker
in a political sense, they were judged by their own standard. This can be seen
in 456d-e, when Socrates makes the comparison of (male) guardians being the
best among citizens (male) and women being judged on their own scale. Socrates
is establishing the limit for women while at the same time encouraging the
one-man one-art concept, that one hones in on what they’re good at. In doing
so, he acknowledges that the female guardians have different roles than the
male guardians when he describes the role of the woman guardian in the
supervision of nursing (460d).
This is where I
believe this is where the city-soul analogy gets complex. If women are the same
in nature as men and fill the same roles, then we don’t need new parts of the
soul for the addition of women to our city. But it seems clear that although
they are the same by nature, women are different in some way because they have
different strengths and weaknesses which lead them to play different roles in
the city. I read this as a divergence of the three parts of the soul. Although
a woman guardian is still a guardian, she supervises over something a male
guardian doesn’t. In light of the analogy, it would appear then that the
calculating, spirited and desiring parts of the soul can be further divided. In
one individual, there would be multiple calculating parts calculating. Although
I see the practicality in women playing different roles than men, I’m not sure
if Socrates wishes to add this element to the soul, which could be the reason
he is reluctant to approach this topic.
The second wave
also complicates the city- soul analogy but in a much different way. Socrates
does not hesitate to define the second wave, but immediately after doing so
Glaucon questions the possibility and beneficialness. Although Socrates
believes that it is only the former that should be questioned, but
never-the-less “submit[s] to the penalty,” and asks if he can “take a holiday
like the idle men who are accustomed to feast their minds for themselves when
they walk along” (458a). First, it is interesting that Plato uses the word
feast. This could be a reference to the dinner-date Socrates was promised, of
which he has now realized he won’t be in attendance. But it is interesting too
that Socrates deflects here, saying that possibility isn’t important for us to
consider now but we can do it later. But as we know, he only half-heartedly
addresses this concern later when he claims it’s contingent on the third wave.
It’s weird, and like the first wave, I read it as a clunky beginning to the
argument because of its implications on the city soul analogy. Where he is
resistant to the first wave, here he is admitting the limitations of this wave.
The second wave is
about the holding in common of women and children. Because of the way Socrates
sets up this argument, as seen above, it is necessary for him just to jump
straight into it and argue for the benefit of women and children being held in
common in the city. The first concern here is of sexual mixing, which is to be
controlled by the rulers. It is interesting here, because the quotation, “And
the most beneficial marriages would be sacred” (458e), is a direct reference to
Zeus and Hera, a brother and sister. While Socrates is somewhat clear about the
prohibition of such an act, I believe it could be a reference to the guardians
and auxiliaries needing to be married together, or in agreement. The argument
for these two parts of the city soul analogy being in harmony can be seen all
throughout The Republic, but it is here in Book V that the auxiliaries and guardians
are shown as more similar than different. For example, in 464a-b, in discussing
what is the cause of holding things in common and the greatest good of the pain
and pleasure of the whole city, he gives credit to both the community of women
and children among the guardians as well as the auxiliaries. I also would argue
that 468c, which references soldiers in battle and then going back to who can
have kids, is saying that the auxiliaries are also included in who can have
children.
It is later in
this wave that two big implications on the soul arise through the auxiliaries.
The first I will call the second test. The first test comes in Book III where
all of the auxiliaries and guardians who have been reared and educated are
tested to see if they are worthy of being a guardian. Although most scholars
see this not as a changing of modes, per say, but as a distinction and refining
of the guardians, I challenge this with a conversation in the second wave of
Book V: “’Now what about the business of war?’ I said. ‘How must your soldiers
behave toward one another and the enemies? … If one of them’ I said, ‘leaves
the ranks or throws away his arms, or does anything of the sort because of
cowardice, mustn’t he be demoted to craftsman or farmer?’” (468a). This is the
second test. The rearing and education of the youth are tested in Book III and
only those who stick true to their education become guardians. In Book V it is
a testing of the auxiliaries on the field of battle, and they are no longer
youth. Both cases to me suggest movement. While I acknowledge that the test in
Book III is less clear about whether it is a changing of modes or just a
refinement, here it is clearer to me. The example uses a grown auxiliary in
battle, and if he fails, he will no longer be an auxiliary but a worker. He has
been trained for battle just as the guardians and auxiliaries had been trained
for the first one in Book III, but by the auxiliary being full grown here, it
implies he has been trained in everything essential to being a soldier, and
fails not due to youth but because of his own lack of virtue (non-courageous). The
way I read this in light of the analogy, is that if the spirited part of your
soul is not being courageous, he is giving into desires and no longer doing his
job. But here, it appears when the spirited part loses its virtue of courage,
that part of the soul is not only giving in, but it is changing forms.
The second
implication of the soul in the second wave is the outside consideration of the
soul. When describing how the soldiers ought to act in war, he spends a good
deal of time delineating between Greeks and barbarians. By claiming that our
city is Greek automatically groups it as a city in a country. But not only
that, the Greece of this time is a nation of city states. So what does it mean
that they’ll “be a lover of the Greeks? Won’t they consider Greece their own
and hold common holy places along with the other Greeks?” (470e). It’s a city
within a country, but the country acts like a city itself. They hold things in
common externally – just like the city does internally – and love each other,
just as the leaders of the city love wisdom. The language is all the same as
describing the city. There can even be faction among Greeks, while faction is
only something that can happen to one’s own. But it’s not enough for cities to
work together to form a country, “Then they’ll correct their opponents in a
kindly way...” (471a). The word here for correct actually means “to make
moderate,” implying that the correcting is happening in respect city soul
analogy. They are literally educating their opponents of war on how to become
just, and in doing so they’ll be like the just Greek cities. I believe the
implications here on the soul are the beginnings of the argument for the
external use of justice. A just soul can align itself with other just souls who
have similar loves and things in common as well as an obligation of the soul to
educate those they come into contact with.
The interlude
between the second and third waves is odd in that Socrates addresses the notion
of possibility, which I alluded to above, by only saying it relies on the third
wave. There are clear practical limits to a philosopher king, especially the
paradox in the argument of needing a philosopher king to create a just city. But
really, if the interlocutors have been interpreting Socrates via the city-soul
analogy through the first two waves, the third is something he has essentially
already taught us. The notion of a part of the city being more powerful and
better discerning than the rest is clearly seen in the guardians; essentially
all he’s doing here is clarifying what a guardian is. Don not be deceived by
the difficulty of selling the argument that a philosopher should rule the city,
as well as the already apparent argument of whether it is possible to cultivate
such a man. But still see that he has already established their need, he just
had not labeled the guardians as philosophers yet. For these reasons, I think
the ideas brought forward in the first two waves are much more controversial
than the third wave in the light of the soul.