Thoughts on Plato

The first blog I attempted to post was done incorrectly because I created a new blog altogether; after some searching, I found the blog. The following is from that time:

During our reading of Theatetus (PHI 360), the topic of knowledge came into play, both in the metaphysical sense and the theoretical sense. While approaching the concept of knowledge from a theoretical sense, Branden asked whether we can understand knowledge as being quantitative or qualitative. At the time, we didn't spend much time developing that idea out; I hope to do so here.

There seems to be two ways of understanding knowledge that each provide interesting routes. We can either understand the concept and thing-hood of knowledge as a summation of its parts or it can be understood qualitatively. When I say qualitatively, I mean to say knowledge can be understood independent from the examples it provides; this idea, to me, seems similar to the discussion provided by Socrates on the topic of "the good" vs. "a good" in the republic.

I believe that knowledge can only be understood conceptually as being qualitatively; however, just as a scientific theory necessitates hypothesis (and the premises that preclude the hypothesis) that can be tested, so also it seems necessary to evaluate examples of knowledge quantitatively to judge the overall theory of knowledge qualitatively.

Additionally, the concept of knowledge is in and of itself a truth that is capable of standing independently, just as the concept of color can exist without the necessity of providing examples. However, for the sake of ascribing what is and isn't knowledge, it is necessary to judge an opinion as being true or false. It is also necessary to provide an account of what has been stated so that if the opinion is determined as false or true, future philosophers are influenced correctly from the judgement brought upon it.

It is here that the opinion or concept of knowledge is influenced quantitatively by a majority rule. Even so, it seems possible that an error might be made in judging the opinion as either knowledge or ignorance; the repercussions of this seem to be great regardless of the outcome. Even if a false opinion is crushed, a negative outcome occurs from this: the extermination of future statements from the individual who made the opinion (both true and false). John Stuart Mill touches on this much later in the series of time, but I believe it is prudent to know as well.