Parmenides

Parmenides is one of the hardest Plato texts that I have read up to this date. In the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates challenges Zeno/Parmenides view on "the one"; Zeno/Parmenides believes that it is absurd for anyone to believe in the view of plurality of beings. That is, it is impossible for things to be both like and unlike (along with many other terms that are contrary by nature). While discussing what "the one" would be, Parmenides goes through many contradictory statements to discuss what "the one" isn't; by doing this, he is providing a reductio ad absurdum argument for what the "one" is by discussing what it couldn't possibly be. The Reductio ad absurdum argument is used in Aristotle's Metaphysics book to account for logical forms that don't appear valid at first glance.

Yet, the reductio ad absurdum does not necessarily provide new information about the concept at hand; instead, this line of argument to me is only able to express what the item isn't.
It seems that this tool of reductio ad absurdum works well when it isn't fully examined by a keen philosophical mind; that is, as a tool for persuasion, it works very well. It compares two concepts, one particular concept in a negative light and the other idea in a more positive light; it attempts to prove that the idea in the positive is the only logical conclusion left after the validity of the other concept has been proven false.

I look back on Parmenides' argument of oneness and it seems that his line of reasoning still leaves other possibilities; I do not feel satisfied with the results that arise out of the argument simply because they conclude out necessity with few alternatives that might still be possible.

I believe that we (collectively as a society), still use this type of reasoning (even though it can be fallacious) to a certain degree. We still forget to look for more alternatives to the conclusion we quickly arise to; that is, in any given situation, I believe that although there is only one possible conclusion that is valid, it is still possible for a conclusion to arise out of premises that is invalid; not because of a flaw in the argument, but by not introducing enough facts to arise to the correct conclusion. In the case of describing how things relate to one another, I believe that we are simply unable to capture even one quality or concept of all the possible things in this world (universe, space outside that universe, etc. to infinite).

Still, I must commend Plato's attempt to reconcile all the things of this earth in his theories of forms so that philosophers might know all instances of a form by knowing the form itself.

In Phaedo Socrates commits suicide; he infers various reasons why philosophers should not fear death but welcome it as well. Is suicide than a reasonable act? Some might surmise that he did not have a choice in the matter since he was sentenced to death, and it was also decided that he should die this way. My question is than as follow is Socrates willingness to die any less a suicide?

I might agree with the idea that Socrates acceptance of his condemnation is a testament to his beliefs that justice should be according to those elected to give it. Those who condemned him however did fit Socrates description of wise. They were not philosopher kings or philosophers at all because if they were I am assuming Socrates would never have been put on trial. Where than is the logic behind Socrates’ suicide? Doesn’t that very act undermine his thoughts on our nature?

I remain adamant that Socrates had a choice; he could have refused to commit suicide. In his refusal he would have defended all his views amongst which are the one that suicide no matter the circumstance is wrong. Isn’t fighting for one’s belief more important than yielding to the wishes of others especially when it compromises who we are? Socrates wish to die and his elation towards the end is no different to me than those committing suicide to escape the pain of being alive. Unless of course Socrates meant that suicide is acceptable base on circumstances.

Parmenides: The One

I would like to continue this discussion about the forms and this description of “the one” in Parmenides. First, I would like to conclude that the forms and “the one” are the same thing because the context seems to imply that this is the case even though it is not explicit despite the passage that seems to separate the two things. However, in making this conclusion, as brought up in class, how do we explain that more than one thing can embody the same form if it (the form) is one and cannot be divided? Could we offer the conclusion that more than one thing is a reflection of a form but does not acquire an actual piece of that form? Or should we go with Socrates' theory of the sunlight? Or should we conclude the theory of the sail that was proposed in the text? I would like to propose my personal theory that I just mentioned regarding a reflection. Perhaps each form is like a mirror. A mirror is able to reflect multiple different things at one time without being divided. Also, in terms of being in parts or being a whole, the mirror analogy also fits well. I would like to argue that forms do not have parts. Forms, like a mirror, do not require to be in parts to reflect, or to embody multiple things.

Now, in terms of "the one" being in neither in rest or in motion as discussed in Parmenides, how does that come to be is the big question. One automatically assumes that if something is not in rest, then it is in motion, and if it is not in motion, then it is in rest. It seems that it is only two options here and no between. However, maybe one could suggest that it is in this state of becoming in which it was in this state of rest and is becoming in motion, or it was in motion and is becoming at rest. In other words, it is in neither rest or motion because it is in its becoming stage. However, there is never any indication by the text that it will ever reach a state of rest or motion, so if we go with my theory, then the one will always remain in the becoming stages of being in motion or in rest.

What can Parmenides tell us about Being?

What can Parminedes tell us about being? He offers a description and gives a few arguments. He argues that being is eternal and being cannot come into being and also that it cannot go out of being. Being cannot come into being because the problem would then become where did it come from. So if being were to come into being then it would have to come from something that is not being. And also, what is non being? Parminedes says that non being cannot be a concept. Another thing is that being cannot go out of being because then where would it go? I think that this is where Parmenides gets his concept of eternal from.

Parmenides also claims that being is indivisible, that it cannot be divided into parts. Being is one, according to Parmenides. If being were to have parts then we would have to say that this one thing is a part of being and this other thing is a part of being, etc. I mean, with the example from my hand on my body. I know that my hand is different than my foot, right? My hand is not my foot. But with being this concept is difficult because we cannot say something like “not being” because Parmenides rules out the concept of not being. From this Parminedes concludes that being is one.

From this I am assuming that Parmenides is referring to reality being one. I think Parmenides is a genius.

Theory about Plato

I was thinking that maybe the reason why Plato never answers any of his questions in a more direct manner is because he does not want to influence our answers. While he tries to teach us the right way to think about a topic and guide us towards certain topics worth exploring, he does not impose us his ideologies. Reading his works separately I will admit is not an easy task; relating them under one umbrella however, for me particularly, make all his ideas more sensible.

While Plato seems to specifically dissect the human soul in the republic; I have come to believe that most of his works have one specific goal to analyze the different parts of human nature, and to help individually define who we are. The books that we’ve covered thus far examined virtue, perception, justice etc; they all have a common thread and its man’s true nature.

Is it possible that Plato knew the answers to the questions he sought? Is it possible that he did not answer them to give our own conclusion a sense of individuality? I know of course that it is probably a possibility I’d be grateful to know why exactly it would be a plausible theory?

Plato: Godfather of Soul

I believe that at this point, I could portray fairly accurately the model of the soul for Socrates. Firstly, the soul is immortal, unable to be broken, and exists in an immaterial sense. It is the master of the body (not vice-versa), yet can still be influenced by bodily pleasures. It leaves the body upon death (in a sense, it causes the death of the body and causes the life of a new body) and goes into the realm of forms where it commutes with all forms and gains all possible knowledge. Aside from all of this, I am interested as to where the soul originated.

In the Timeaus, there are two accounts given of the creation of earth: the first account is that of the Intellectual and the second account being that of Necessity.  I am particularly curious about the second account's claim that there are three things that existed even before the universe existed (out of necessity): being, becoming, and space. I am curious as to how the soul would exist in one of these three conditions if it were to exist before the universe came to be* (for lack of a better word). If the soul were to exist as being, then it would be unable to change; that is, it wouldn't change from one body to the next, or change from the material realm to the form realm. If the soul were to exist as becoming, it is necessary that it would always be changing and becoming. This condition would render the soul as being made and then destroyed constantly if this cycle were to come close to being in the infinite nature of the soul. But this wouldn't be the same soul in a sense, it would be a new soul created and destroyed each time. Yet, surely, the soul doesn't exist in space which is to be understand as simply the place for something to be or become.

If I am to salvage the image of the soul for me, I'm left to consider a few new possibilities: a) the soul might not be immortal, b) the soul has a part that is immortal and a part that isn't immortal (one part that is being and another part that is becomming), or c) the soul came after the universe was made. In the nature of Socrates, I wish to maintain that the soul is immortal; however, I wish to shine light on the fact that Socrates has proposed a model of the soul that contained different parts that were constituted an entire soul. Perhaps, in a sense, it is possible to present this model altered for our purposes. Perhaps the soul is that which is composed of both being and becoming at once; that is, perhaps it has a certain nature of actualization (to coin Aristotle) and a nature of potentiality. The soul would have two distinct parts that constitute a sense of worldly being that is constantly becoming something new so as to correspond to the world in flux and it would have a part that always is the same and doesn't change to the world. To think of this graphically, the part of being (not changing) would be like the center with the part of becoming (changing) on the outside.
Yet, even with this model, I'm afraid that more problems arise; is it possible to both be and to also become? If this is so, there would be no necessity for the soul to enter the body to be its master (if it has the power to actualize all at once with no body).

Final thought: the soul of the world must have come after the universe existed, or at the same time by both necessity and by wordily definition. If the soul of the world came after the universe existed, then it seems to follow by sub-alternation that the souls of people came afterward as well.

Families

I want to talk about the subject in 18d of the Timaeus reading when they were talking about the procreation of children. This subject was odd for me because Timaeus and Socrates said that they agreed that everyone should have spouses and that things should be put into place that hinder people from recognizing his or her own child. Also, everything would be set up so that everyone would look at each other as family. To me, this sounds like some kind of communist way of thinking. I can’t imagine why they would agree that this system of raising families would possibly be sufficient. In my opinion, this would be the worst system because it would prevent everyone from knowing what a real family is. How could this system possibly work?

Forms and Creativity

In Phaedo, Plato discusses his theory on forms. He argues that forms hold the true meaning of things in themselves. For instance, Plato speaks about beauty. He says,

[I]f someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons--for all these confuse me--...that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. ...[I]t is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful (Plato 100d-100e).

Plato is arguing that when we apply the term beautiful to an object, we explain this by verbalizing how it exemplifies beauty in describes the characteristic of that thing. However, only the form of beauty can exemplify what beauty is in itself absent from material objects. Also, in relation to the forms, Plato uses the example of height. Plato argues that we become tall after being short in terms of the theory of opposites; however, based on the theory of forms, tallness does not derive from shortness. Tallness is a form that already exists and is separate from shortness. Plato implies that new forms cannot be made instead they are merely discovered. In The Courage to Create, Plato’s theory fits in perfectly with Rollo May’s definition of the courage to create which is “the discovering of new forms” (May 21). So, perhaps, to be creative does not mean one is creating something purely and entirely new, but one is simply discovering something new that no one else has seen. A true artist is able to tap into the realm of the forms and come back bearing gifts of new discoveries. Plato argues that only the soul is able to experience the universe of forms, and to do so, the soul has to be separated from the body. If Plato’s theory is true, then it is as if artists are capable of out of body experiences, and these experiences provide us with art.

May, Rollo. The Courage to Create. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. Print.

Phaedo and Cratylus

In Phaedo, Socrates claims that a true philosopher should not be afraid of death but should look forward to it. For, in death, the soul is separated from the body, and this separation from the body allows the soul to obtain true knowledge through reason. Socrates argues that the body is incapable of obtaining true knowledge because its senses are deceiving, and according to Socrates, “the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it” (Phaedo 65c). Socrates claims that the body is unable to understand things in themselves. The soul is only capable of achieving this. For example, the term “beautiful” in itself cannot be explored by the senses of the body. The body is capable of applying this term to objects saying, “this painting is beautiful because of the arrangement of colors,” but the body is not able to adequately explore the term “beautiful” absent of an object. However, the soul has the ability to examine the term “beautiful” in itself.

This theory that Plato introduces in Phaedo mirrors the theory of names that is presented Cratylus. Plato argues that in obtaining knowledge, or an understanding about something, one should not seek for this knowledge in the object’s name but in the object itself. Now, in the Cratylus, Socrates not does provide a means of achieving this. He claims that this process of gaining true knowledge of an object with the absence of the object’s name is “too large a topic” to be discussed. Well, I am proposing that this theory that is proposed in Phaedo is precisely the answer of how to obtain knowledge about an object absent of its name--you achieve this through the soul.

Da soul and da philosopher's profession

In the Phaedo dialogue, Plato brings up some serious speculation about souls and the afterlife. I say “serious speculation”, not because the subject matter is serious (although it is) but because the arguments and reasoning used by Plato is highly conjectural. For example, Socrates makes use of an old legend in order to state that the “living come into being again from the dead” (pg. 53, 70d). This eventually leads to his “opposites from opposites” argument, which I think everybody thought was ridiculous in class. This is important to note because I find it really interesting how Socrates says “true philosophers make dying their profession, and that to them of all men death is least alarming” (pg. 50, 67e). I’m wondering how the philosopher’s profession could primarily be about a topic that is so indefinite. Philosophy to me seems to be about knowledge, and the philosopher’s profession would be one that pertains to a bit more certainty and conclusiveness than Plato suggests here. However a thing that is entailed in the philosopher’s preparation for death is the nourishment of the soul through doing philosophy, and doing philosophy in of itself has a definite degree of certainty. The only uncertainty is in terming the philosopher’s profession as one of dying and/or preparing for death.

Also, I think Plato would regard the soul as being something more animate and alive, rather than ethereal and mysterious. An example of this would be when he is talking about how the philosopher “frees his soul from association with the body” (pg. 47, 65a). This implies that the soul is a living thing because only living things can be trapped and/or freed. A further example is just in the length of his discussion of the soul. He talks about it a lot, which probably shows that he does not regard it as something beyond his comprehension.

Using Phaedo to Define a Soul

I am going to focus on the discussion in Phaedo that starts at 77b about how the soul can continue to exist after the body has died. By this point Socrates has already established a soul that exists before the body and is used to enable individuals to think they are learning new information, they actually are recalling information that their soul had access to before it was confined to a body.

Throughout 78 and 79 Socrates argues that there are two kinds of substances in the world, the visible and the invisible. He defines the invisible as being noncomposite and unchanging. While at first he just makes the case that forms are in the invisible category he quickly groups souls along with the invisible category. This categorization quickly becomes a problem because Socrates then tries to distinguish different kinds of souls from one another. In doing so he sets up a system of how the soul is supposed to interact with the body. For Socrates the greater the impact the body has on the soul the worse it is for the soul and the soul becomes weighted down and can therefore not reach the level of the forms after death and instead is reincarnated as either an animal or if the individual was good enough a human. In making it so that a soul can inhabit bodies of different species Socrates is making a statement about the nature of the soul. This means that the soul does not have anything to do with reason since that differs on a species basis. This also means that the soul does not contain the inner monologue that an individual has since not all species are capable of language (the inner monologue depends upon language).

As mentioned earlier Socrates thinks that the more of an impact the body has on a soul the more weighed down the soul becomes. This is a problem because of Socrates earlier categorization of souls with the invisible, unchanging, and noncomposite beings. Having the soul in this category was important for Socrates because many people in his time believed that when you died your soul dissipated like a breath and could fade away.

What you end up with is a soul that does not have memory of anything besides forms (because of how language is connected to memory and language is species based), that cannot reason, that does not maintain an inner dialogue, that is weakened by the attachment of a body, and that may or may not be in the same category as forms. Even if the soul is in the same category as forms and is thus unchanging, what you are left with is at most some basic features of the soul as a sort of guiding principle (as discussed in the Republic) that may contain key personality traits (since people become animals that they resemble in personality). I doubt this form of a soul, with so little left to its name, would be much comfort to anyone as a form of eternal life.

Is Plato still relevant today?

Plato, through the spokesperson of Socrates, makes many assumptions about the world and how it operates, both physically and metaphysically. In Phaedo, Socrates is determined to prove the immortality of the soul and his Theory of Recollection. Mixed in all of this is his discussion about Forms. While Socrates’ theories might have been applicable over two thousand years ago, are they still applicable now?

When Socrates discusses sight, for him, the eyes emit light and they observe things, something we know to be false. Similarly, we know what color consists of, it is the wavelengths in the spectrum of light, a concept unfamiliar to Socrates. Another major issue is his belief in the immortality and reincarnation of the soul. While the concept of immortality of the soul is still an on-going discussion today, there are several flaws with his belief in the reincarnation of souls as it applies to his (completely baffling) Theory of Opposites. If souls are immortal and reincarnated, then there must be an infinite minus one number of souls, or else there would be no room for population growth. However, this still seems to contradict Socrates’ Theory of Opposites, which is all about balance. If that many souls exist, then those that are currently “dead” or not in a current incarnation, would vastly outnumber the amount of “living” souls, and the imbalance would have been even greater in the time of Socrates.

Secondly, I am still not convinced by Socrates’ Theory of Recollection. If all knowledge is already there in the soul and we must simply “remember” it by asking the right questions and pursuing philosophy, there where is the room for innovation and invention? How can a society make strides in new technology, or fiction exist as a genre of literature? Unless there is a Form for imagination that is unlimited (but I’m still not entirely sure how that would work) space travel and each alien species created in the imagination would prove this theory wrong.

If all of this is true, then is Socrates' theories only valid if applied to his socio-cultural environment? Does his philosophy exist in a temporal vacuum limited to Ancient Greece? If not, then how do his concepts of the world hold up to all the knowledge and advancements in today’s society?

Forms and Standards

The question I wish to propose here is this: justification aside, to what effect would Plato’s theory of Forms, as discussed primarily using the terminology of the invisible, rather than the visible, realm such as around Phaedo 79a, contribute to an overall change within a society’s cultural metaphysical understanding? To what extent does this advocacy of a perfect, idealistic afterlife for all the virtuous ones so to speak (namely philosophers as far as this text is concerned) establish a perhaps lessened appreciation for life and of the aspects of living if, as Plato seems to propose, these Forms are to be the standards by which all of existence must be compared?

Emphasis throughout the text of Phaedo is placed at great length upon the two strata of a soul’s existence existing before and after this present reality, yet for the most part it would seem to disregard what otherwise Aristotelian philosophy would tend to cover in much greater detail: life as a human being. Within The Nicomachean Ethics, for example, there is great concern for the actions of an individual morally and ethically speaking insofar as it is possible for a human being. One should strive towards the mean within all his or her actions and behaviors, and yet even though Aristotle briefly alludes to a perfect embodiment of one who attains this ‘golden mean’, this great-souled man, the ideal is not one which is conceived as being attainable practically. The theory of means does not present all who fail as deficient by nature in the same manner as do the Forms of Plato, rather they simply serve to illustrate in an understandable, relatable format the abstract concepts of temperance, magnanimity, the virtuous friendship, etc.

For Socrates at Phaedo 74e offers this question: “whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says is like, but deficiently so?” Within the argument advocating for the theory of recollection, there are comparisons made between the invisible and visible realms by Plato for the purposes of accepting the former over the latter as the more desirable.

Although even in modern society individuals may happen upon a certain balance between reality and the afterlife, as the duties of civilized life necessitate for such, ultimately Plato’s theory of Forms would appear to haunt one’s experience of daily living. Surely standards cannot be abolished from the psyche of this social creature that is the human being, for coherent communication would seem to require some ideal essence within an object so as to be able to distinguish its most complete form from what may be seen at present. Concerning the notion of equality, Socrates states to Simmias that “it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality” (74c). Granted that when measuring the length, depth, breadth, extent, and so forth, one needs a standard by which to measure differences between two objects, and yet could not the Forms, or Heaven to use a modern conceptual term, be no different than our society’s anorexic supermodel, whose ideal nature is no more conventionalist than what is proffered by Hermogenes within the Cratylus?

In other words, often when one is presented by what is some notion of perfection, that individual is usually compelled to shape his or her life and natural inclinations to resemble what is perfect, usually what seems to be at the cost of their sense of being human, inextricably flawed. For, rather than working towards some noble cause, ideals in beauty, for example, more often strive to root out the many original differences between individuals, much as is often the case with women who are compared to an ideal so as to highlight minute variations and extricate them. As such, would not individuals arguably be seen to lean towards the conclusion that death would be more significant than life given that the afterlife was to be of such a more enticing, desirable caliber?

The soul

In Plato’s dialogue in Phaedo, Socrates discusses the nature of life after death. To me, the idea of immortality means an endless life or existence. I think that in Plato’s Phaedo, the idea of the soul being immortal is from the spiritual perspective, kind of similar or relating to Christianity and other religions, and it becomes one of the main topics of discussion. Socrates begins with talking about the nature of the soul and he describes it as being separate from the body. In 70a, it is implied that the soul is something physical or material because they were talking about the soul being destroyed. In 70b, the discussion moves to questioning what the soul is capable of and it was said that the soul possesses power and wisdom.

I think that these ideas to tie in with his theory of recollection. If the soul is immortal and it is continually being reborn again, then that would explain part of how the soul knows everything. But then why is it that when we are born again we forget everything that the soul has learned and we have to try and recollect everything? This part is explained in Plato’s other works but it isn’t explained here. But honestly I feel unsatisfied with the way the soul is portrayed because it seems incomplete. I don’t understand what the function of the soul is and also if the soul is material, then what is it made of? If the soul is immortal then that means that it can’t be destroyed.

Lastly, here again Socrates begins an argument and fails to complete it. There is no answer to any of these things about the soul and he leaves us with this endless list of questions. I would just like to know what virtue is, what knowledge is, and what the soul is. If Socrates would just finish what he starts I would be a much happier person.

Thoughts on Plato

The first blog I attempted to post was done incorrectly because I created a new blog altogether; after some searching, I found the blog. The following is from that time:

During our reading of Theatetus (PHI 360), the topic of knowledge came into play, both in the metaphysical sense and the theoretical sense. While approaching the concept of knowledge from a theoretical sense, Branden asked whether we can understand knowledge as being quantitative or qualitative. At the time, we didn't spend much time developing that idea out; I hope to do so here.

There seems to be two ways of understanding knowledge that each provide interesting routes. We can either understand the concept and thing-hood of knowledge as a summation of its parts or it can be understood qualitatively. When I say qualitatively, I mean to say knowledge can be understood independent from the examples it provides; this idea, to me, seems similar to the discussion provided by Socrates on the topic of "the good" vs. "a good" in the republic.

I believe that knowledge can only be understood conceptually as being qualitatively; however, just as a scientific theory necessitates hypothesis (and the premises that preclude the hypothesis) that can be tested, so also it seems necessary to evaluate examples of knowledge quantitatively to judge the overall theory of knowledge qualitatively.

Additionally, the concept of knowledge is in and of itself a truth that is capable of standing independently, just as the concept of color can exist without the necessity of providing examples. However, for the sake of ascribing what is and isn't knowledge, it is necessary to judge an opinion as being true or false. It is also necessary to provide an account of what has been stated so that if the opinion is determined as false or true, future philosophers are influenced correctly from the judgement brought upon it.

It is here that the opinion or concept of knowledge is influenced quantitatively by a majority rule. Even so, it seems possible that an error might be made in judging the opinion as either knowledge or ignorance; the repercussions of this seem to be great regardless of the outcome. Even if a false opinion is crushed, a negative outcome occurs from this: the extermination of future statements from the individual who made the opinion (both true and false). John Stuart Mill touches on this much later in the series of time, but I believe it is prudent to know as well.

The Soul

Following up on this week's discussions and texts:

I would suggest that some more discussion of the soul in Plato's Phaedo is called for. Though I am sure we'll get to it in class!

For instance, what do we think the soul is - what is its nature, what is it made of, and what does it do? Does Plato think of it as a source of life, or is it more of an ethereal, mysterious, and spiritual kind of thing (perhaps similar to the Christian sense)?

Also, although I think it's pretty certain that Plato incorporates earlier theories of the soul in the Phaedo (principally the Pythagorean and Heraclitean ones), I wonder what we make of the notion that the soul is subject to the cosmic process of always emerging and fading according to oppositions? That is, on what ground is it right to say that human birth always emerges from death, and that death conversely always comes from life? One alternative a discerning reader might suggest is that the soul should just *be* - that there's not a demonstrable reason for why it's subject to ebb and flow, wax and wane, coming and going. Presumably the eternal motions of the heavens are more like this; in addition, I would suppose that the life of G(g)od(s) is more like this model.

It's not necessary to post in reply to this specific entry - but this is some food for thought.

Knowledge in Theaetetus

In Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, the concept of knowledge is discussed. One question that I am interested in is whether or not one can lose knowledge. I know this may seem like overstepping; I am wondering if one can lose knowledge before defining what it is and how one gets it. However, I think that there is something to be gained by discussing this quality of knowledge, as a means of getting to its definition.

Now, on one hand, it seems apparent that if one has knowledge, one cannot lose it. On the other hand, there seem to be occasions when this occurs. For example, say that one can know that Paris is the capitol of France, or any other similar fact. Then, years go by, and someone says, “hey, what is the capitol of France,” or “what is the air speed velocity of an unladen swallow?” Something one used to know, but when it is asked, one cannot remember the answer. Does one still “know” the answer, or did one truly forget it?

According to the Socratic theory of recollection, one knows all things and has just forgotten them; in which case one needs only be prompted to memory in order know again. However, there seems to be some misuse of terms: if one has forgotten, it would stand to reason that one does not know any more. Therefore, one cannot remember that which one has not forgotten, or lost. The quibble here is that knowledge must be ephemeral or fleeting, in order to be forgettable.

So, if one can forget knowledge, then it does not seem to be such a special thing, if it is temporary. I wonder if knowledge as a fleeting thing sheds any light on what “knowledge” is. Whether it is attained solely through the perception or not, it is forgettable. A further question would then be are there different levels of knowing; i.e. the closer or more distinct something is in the mind’s eye (or eye, if knowledge is perception), the more one “knows” it. Likewise, if one is closer to forgetting something, is it less known. This, to me, is an interesting question that bares further thought.

Plato: knowledge and perception

The topic of Plato’s Theatetus is ‘what is knowledge.’ Throughout the dialogue the idea that knowledge is perception is repeatedly mentioned. The definition of knowledge equaling perception has a few unintended outcomes that Socrates tries to work through. One of those outcomes is that no individual can have a false perception. This creates multiple problems including what is ‘true’ when two people disagree about what they are perceiving; and how someone can change their mind about a perception. In other words, how can a person realize that they were mistaken about what they originally thought they saw?

I think the way to reconcile no false perception and people disagreeing is to look into the difference between the language that people use and what they actually mean. An example of this is: two people are standing in a room and one says that the room is cold and the other says that the room is hot. Now it seems as though this means that if no one can be wrong about their perceptions then the room is both hot and cold at the same time. But what this actually means is that person A feels the 70*F temperature of the room and finds that it feels cold to them, not that it is actually cold, and person B feels the same temperature and just responds differently to that temperature. This leads to both people having an accurate perception of the same thing and being able to disagree about which has the ‘true’ answer.

A person can change their mind about a perception and still not have had a false perception the first time if they go through the following process. The person first looks at a wall. After looking at the wall they state that the wall is red, at the time this perception is true. They then picture a red apple, or hold a red apple up to the wall, and realize that the wall is actually orange. What this really means is that the individual saw an orange wall and mistakenly said that it was a red wall, but they had the correct perception of an orange wall all along they simply mislabeled the color.

Knowledge

If knowledge is truth I simply cannot accept that it is perception alone. Perception is so often subjective that it cannot be the unique representation of the absolute truth. I do not disagree that it is an integral part of what knowledge is. Knowledge cannot be absolutely impartial; its foundation has to include the personal outlook that perception provides. Nevertheless knowledge solely base on our views is not factual enough to be truth because it is inconsistent and personal. Perception allow too much of a margin for error. I personally believe in order for knowledge to be viewed as truth learning, experience, and reasoning should be included in its definition. Learning of course can be attributed to perception and experience as well. Reasoning however I believe give perception more substance. Reason implies the use of logic which I don’t think perception often applies. Reason allows knowledge to be more than personal because it forces us to analyze our perceptions but the things independent of ourselves as well.
I do have a question regarding knowledge being perception. Protagoras endorses the idea that “what appears is to each one” and from that statement “knowledge is perception” was defined. Socrates however said this particular statement “neither can by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by itself, this quality” doesn’t this statement itself implies that perception itself is not only thing knowledge is base on? Or am I taking the sentence out of context?

Meno and the LACK OF VIRTUE.

First of all, I thought the dialogue of Meno was an easy read. In the beginning, Meno and Socrates begin with the discussion of trying to find out what virtue is. Immediately I get drawn in, because personally I would like to know what virtue is too. So then the question arises of whether or not virtue is something that can be taught and what is really funny about this is that they still haven’t been able to answer the original question about WHAT VIRTUE IS. It is at this point in the text that I realize that I may end up being disappointed.

Furthermore, Socrates decides to pump Meno with a bunch of questions about virtue to see if he knows what it is. At this point I begin to wonder why Socrates would think that Meno would know what virtue is if he didn’t even know what it is. I mean, Socrates is supposed to be the all knowing man of wisdom after all. Another issue that puzzles me, the fact that Socrates thinks that we already know everything and that its just a matter of recollecting it. I seriously disagree with this so I am just going to leave it at that because it just seems like a topic that doesn’t even make sense, much less be proven.

One of the last topics of discussion, Socrates and Meno begin to wonder whether or not a person can seek out something that he doesn’t yet know. This also causes problems for me because Socrates just got out of a conversation talking about recollection, but then he makes the claim about whether or not they can seek out something that they don’t know. At this point I am fuming at Socrates.

Lastly, at the end of Meno I start getting excited because I’m thinking that I am going to finally find out what virtue is after reading all the NONSENSE, but at the very end Socrates tells Meno that he has to leave and that they will continue the discussion later. REALLY?

The Meaning of Virtue

I would like to speak on this overarching theme of virtue that is present in Meno. I do not want to focus on the original question that is raised in Meno, which is the question of whether virtue can be taught, but I want to examine the newly evolved question that was later raised in the text of what virtue is. For, before one can truly determine whether something can be taught, there has to be a stated definition of the subject at hand. Now, in the dialogue, Meno provides multiple characteristics of virtue, but he fails to provide a definition of virtue that describes virtue as a whole. As the dialogue comes to an end, Meno and Socrates still have not reached a conclusion of what virtue is, and they never do. However, I believe that if one is able to speak about something, then surely one is able to provide a definition that describes that thing as a whole.

In continuing to ponder this question of what virtue is, while reading for one of my classes, I came across a very intriguing passage from a book entitled The Courage to Create by phycologist Rollo May. This passage possibly holds the answer to this highly over processed question of the meaning of virtue. The passage is lengthy, but I feel it needs to be quoted in its entirety. It reads,

Courage is not a virtue or value among other personal values like love or fidelity. It is the foundation

that underlies and gives reality to all other virtues and personal values. Without courage our love pales

into mere dependency. Without courage our fidelity becomes conformism.

The word courage comes from the same stem as the French word coeur, meaning “heart.” Thus just as one’s

heart, by pumping blood to one’s arms, legs, and brain enables all the other physical organs to function, so

courage makes possible all the psychological virtues. Without courage other values wither away into mere

facsimiles of virtue. (May 13)

According to May, virtue is courage, and he does not mean that courage is an aspect, or characteristic of virtue but that it defines virtue as a whole. As for myself, I agree with him, but I would like to hear others’ thoughts on this extraordinary claim.

Works Cited: May, Rollo. The Courage to Create. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. Print.

Theatetus Reading #1

Some reflections on what we talked about today:

The problem of knowledge as evaluated by Socrates and Theatetus seems to be something like this: if we agree that knowledge is perception or similar to perception ("Man is the measure of all things" -Protagoras), then we must dissect what's being perceived vs. the act occurring in the perceiver. So for example if I perceive a table, then we must understand the object that I am seeing, the table itself, and then, whatever achievement is happening in me that allows me to see the table (e.g. eyesight, vision, beholding, etc.).

So is the table zapping my eyes with an image of itself? How does it do that? And conversely, does my eyesight perform some operation of its own, e.g. processing the light beams bouncing off of the table and into the eyes' retinae?

Socrates seems to suppose that when we perceive something there is a rather passive act occurring in eyesight such that it receives whatever perceptual material that comes through. This is what he seems to mean when referring to the idea of "Becoming"; assuming that perception is caused by motion of some sort (because nothing would ever happen if reality was pure "being," i.e. static and motionless), then perception must happen whenever a "motion" is imparted to eyesight. Finally, because we don't have any control over how things appear to us (again because perception is caused by an external stimulus), this would seem to be why knowledge is in fact perception. Man is the measure of all things in that the world tells us how things are --- I see a table because the table conveys itself to me in some fashion. I "know" whatever it is I see.

Some questions left unanswered:

How do we account for what philosophers call "mind-independent realities"? For instance how do I know the table is really there in and of itself? Socrates claims that motions causing perception show the world to be in a state of flux as far as we are concerned, in which case I can't make arbitrary conclusions about how the "world" actually "is".

Secondly, how do we get all of this to jive with our everyday sensibility? We all "know" that if there is a table in the room we all see it; and likewise that if we leave the room the table will be there when we return. But if all my knowledge originates in perception then...

Welcome for Platonists

Hi - this is for students in PHI 360 - to let you know you've found the right place for posting Plato blog entries.

First entry due Thursday 1/27!