Knowledge in Theaetetus

In Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus, the concept of knowledge is discussed. One question that I am interested in is whether or not one can lose knowledge. I know this may seem like overstepping; I am wondering if one can lose knowledge before defining what it is and how one gets it. However, I think that there is something to be gained by discussing this quality of knowledge, as a means of getting to its definition.

Now, on one hand, it seems apparent that if one has knowledge, one cannot lose it. On the other hand, there seem to be occasions when this occurs. For example, say that one can know that Paris is the capitol of France, or any other similar fact. Then, years go by, and someone says, “hey, what is the capitol of France,” or “what is the air speed velocity of an unladen swallow?” Something one used to know, but when it is asked, one cannot remember the answer. Does one still “know” the answer, or did one truly forget it?

According to the Socratic theory of recollection, one knows all things and has just forgotten them; in which case one needs only be prompted to memory in order know again. However, there seems to be some misuse of terms: if one has forgotten, it would stand to reason that one does not know any more. Therefore, one cannot remember that which one has not forgotten, or lost. The quibble here is that knowledge must be ephemeral or fleeting, in order to be forgettable.

So, if one can forget knowledge, then it does not seem to be such a special thing, if it is temporary. I wonder if knowledge as a fleeting thing sheds any light on what “knowledge” is. Whether it is attained solely through the perception or not, it is forgettable. A further question would then be are there different levels of knowing; i.e. the closer or more distinct something is in the mind’s eye (or eye, if knowledge is perception), the more one “knows” it. Likewise, if one is closer to forgetting something, is it less known. This, to me, is an interesting question that bares further thought.

Plato: knowledge and perception

The topic of Plato’s Theatetus is ‘what is knowledge.’ Throughout the dialogue the idea that knowledge is perception is repeatedly mentioned. The definition of knowledge equaling perception has a few unintended outcomes that Socrates tries to work through. One of those outcomes is that no individual can have a false perception. This creates multiple problems including what is ‘true’ when two people disagree about what they are perceiving; and how someone can change their mind about a perception. In other words, how can a person realize that they were mistaken about what they originally thought they saw?

I think the way to reconcile no false perception and people disagreeing is to look into the difference between the language that people use and what they actually mean. An example of this is: two people are standing in a room and one says that the room is cold and the other says that the room is hot. Now it seems as though this means that if no one can be wrong about their perceptions then the room is both hot and cold at the same time. But what this actually means is that person A feels the 70*F temperature of the room and finds that it feels cold to them, not that it is actually cold, and person B feels the same temperature and just responds differently to that temperature. This leads to both people having an accurate perception of the same thing and being able to disagree about which has the ‘true’ answer.

A person can change their mind about a perception and still not have had a false perception the first time if they go through the following process. The person first looks at a wall. After looking at the wall they state that the wall is red, at the time this perception is true. They then picture a red apple, or hold a red apple up to the wall, and realize that the wall is actually orange. What this really means is that the individual saw an orange wall and mistakenly said that it was a red wall, but they had the correct perception of an orange wall all along they simply mislabeled the color.

Knowledge

If knowledge is truth I simply cannot accept that it is perception alone. Perception is so often subjective that it cannot be the unique representation of the absolute truth. I do not disagree that it is an integral part of what knowledge is. Knowledge cannot be absolutely impartial; its foundation has to include the personal outlook that perception provides. Nevertheless knowledge solely base on our views is not factual enough to be truth because it is inconsistent and personal. Perception allow too much of a margin for error. I personally believe in order for knowledge to be viewed as truth learning, experience, and reasoning should be included in its definition. Learning of course can be attributed to perception and experience as well. Reasoning however I believe give perception more substance. Reason implies the use of logic which I don’t think perception often applies. Reason allows knowledge to be more than personal because it forces us to analyze our perceptions but the things independent of ourselves as well.
I do have a question regarding knowledge being perception. Protagoras endorses the idea that “what appears is to each one” and from that statement “knowledge is perception” was defined. Socrates however said this particular statement “neither can by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by itself, this quality” doesn’t this statement itself implies that perception itself is not only thing knowledge is base on? Or am I taking the sentence out of context?

Meno and the LACK OF VIRTUE.

First of all, I thought the dialogue of Meno was an easy read. In the beginning, Meno and Socrates begin with the discussion of trying to find out what virtue is. Immediately I get drawn in, because personally I would like to know what virtue is too. So then the question arises of whether or not virtue is something that can be taught and what is really funny about this is that they still haven’t been able to answer the original question about WHAT VIRTUE IS. It is at this point in the text that I realize that I may end up being disappointed.

Furthermore, Socrates decides to pump Meno with a bunch of questions about virtue to see if he knows what it is. At this point I begin to wonder why Socrates would think that Meno would know what virtue is if he didn’t even know what it is. I mean, Socrates is supposed to be the all knowing man of wisdom after all. Another issue that puzzles me, the fact that Socrates thinks that we already know everything and that its just a matter of recollecting it. I seriously disagree with this so I am just going to leave it at that because it just seems like a topic that doesn’t even make sense, much less be proven.

One of the last topics of discussion, Socrates and Meno begin to wonder whether or not a person can seek out something that he doesn’t yet know. This also causes problems for me because Socrates just got out of a conversation talking about recollection, but then he makes the claim about whether or not they can seek out something that they don’t know. At this point I am fuming at Socrates.

Lastly, at the end of Meno I start getting excited because I’m thinking that I am going to finally find out what virtue is after reading all the NONSENSE, but at the very end Socrates tells Meno that he has to leave and that they will continue the discussion later. REALLY?

The Meaning of Virtue

I would like to speak on this overarching theme of virtue that is present in Meno. I do not want to focus on the original question that is raised in Meno, which is the question of whether virtue can be taught, but I want to examine the newly evolved question that was later raised in the text of what virtue is. For, before one can truly determine whether something can be taught, there has to be a stated definition of the subject at hand. Now, in the dialogue, Meno provides multiple characteristics of virtue, but he fails to provide a definition of virtue that describes virtue as a whole. As the dialogue comes to an end, Meno and Socrates still have not reached a conclusion of what virtue is, and they never do. However, I believe that if one is able to speak about something, then surely one is able to provide a definition that describes that thing as a whole.

In continuing to ponder this question of what virtue is, while reading for one of my classes, I came across a very intriguing passage from a book entitled The Courage to Create by phycologist Rollo May. This passage possibly holds the answer to this highly over processed question of the meaning of virtue. The passage is lengthy, but I feel it needs to be quoted in its entirety. It reads,

Courage is not a virtue or value among other personal values like love or fidelity. It is the foundation

that underlies and gives reality to all other virtues and personal values. Without courage our love pales

into mere dependency. Without courage our fidelity becomes conformism.

The word courage comes from the same stem as the French word coeur, meaning “heart.” Thus just as one’s

heart, by pumping blood to one’s arms, legs, and brain enables all the other physical organs to function, so

courage makes possible all the psychological virtues. Without courage other values wither away into mere

facsimiles of virtue. (May 13)

According to May, virtue is courage, and he does not mean that courage is an aspect, or characteristic of virtue but that it defines virtue as a whole. As for myself, I agree with him, but I would like to hear others’ thoughts on this extraordinary claim.

Works Cited: May, Rollo. The Courage to Create. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. Print.

Theatetus Reading #1

Some reflections on what we talked about today:

The problem of knowledge as evaluated by Socrates and Theatetus seems to be something like this: if we agree that knowledge is perception or similar to perception ("Man is the measure of all things" -Protagoras), then we must dissect what's being perceived vs. the act occurring in the perceiver. So for example if I perceive a table, then we must understand the object that I am seeing, the table itself, and then, whatever achievement is happening in me that allows me to see the table (e.g. eyesight, vision, beholding, etc.).

So is the table zapping my eyes with an image of itself? How does it do that? And conversely, does my eyesight perform some operation of its own, e.g. processing the light beams bouncing off of the table and into the eyes' retinae?

Socrates seems to suppose that when we perceive something there is a rather passive act occurring in eyesight such that it receives whatever perceptual material that comes through. This is what he seems to mean when referring to the idea of "Becoming"; assuming that perception is caused by motion of some sort (because nothing would ever happen if reality was pure "being," i.e. static and motionless), then perception must happen whenever a "motion" is imparted to eyesight. Finally, because we don't have any control over how things appear to us (again because perception is caused by an external stimulus), this would seem to be why knowledge is in fact perception. Man is the measure of all things in that the world tells us how things are --- I see a table because the table conveys itself to me in some fashion. I "know" whatever it is I see.

Some questions left unanswered:

How do we account for what philosophers call "mind-independent realities"? For instance how do I know the table is really there in and of itself? Socrates claims that motions causing perception show the world to be in a state of flux as far as we are concerned, in which case I can't make arbitrary conclusions about how the "world" actually "is".

Secondly, how do we get all of this to jive with our everyday sensibility? We all "know" that if there is a table in the room we all see it; and likewise that if we leave the room the table will be there when we return. But if all my knowledge originates in perception then...

Welcome for Platonists

Hi - this is for students in PHI 360 - to let you know you've found the right place for posting Plato blog entries.

First entry due Thursday 1/27!